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Abstract 
 This study will take an economic historical approach to the Arab Spring in an 
attempt to discover why citizens across the Middle East and North Africa rose up 
against their respective governments and demand change. The study will focus, 
more specifically, on Egypt and Tunisia where the revolutions were successful in 
overthrowing Ben Ali and Mubarak. It will be shown that the Arab Spring in Egypt 
and Tunisia as well as regionally was primarily the result of decades of economic 
stagnation and regression for the vast majority of citizens as well a notable increase 
in the levels of education across the populations. A plethora of concrete statistics, 
including but not limited to the Gini coefficient, unemployment rates, and GDP per 
capita, all combine to show that the Middle East and North Africa was not only a 
highly unequal place but also one where citizens found ample reason to demand 
meaningful change.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
Ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam, the people want the fall of the regime. This 
simple expression used by Tunisian youth during the overthrow of the then 
president and dictator Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali captures the humble and yet complex 
nature of the Arab Spring movement that began in late December of 2010. The 
desire for change in the face of difficult circumstances is a natural human response. 
However, achieving this transformation in the face of ruthless authoritarian 
dictatorships is a bloody and challenging proposition. Revolution is an inherently 
convoluted and complex affair. Different groups with sometimes similar and 
oftentimes disparate ideals compete for change in the face of entrenched and 
powerful regimes based oftentimes on a plethora of reasons. The case of the Arab 
Spring, especially Tunisia and Egypt, showcase these complexities of revolution, 
both causal and perpetuating. 
Additionally, a variety of explanations have been offered presented by 
scholars and the media, regarding not only the cause of the Arab Spring but also 
what its lasting effects will be. Some have emphasized the impact of the large youth 
populations, unemployment, social media, social discontent, women, general 
economic conditions, and increasing human rights violations, among numerous 
others. However, it is the position of this paper that the search for economic stability 
and opportunity in the face of economic uncertainty, which led to large-scale events 
 2 
that were decidedly unpredictable in nature.1 This is not, however, meant to dismiss 
the validity of other explanations regarding the causation of the Arab Spring, but is 
instead meant to place greater emphasis on the importance of the economic factors 
as a major cause of the uprisings.  
Furthermore, the uniqueness of the region’s political and economic systems 
will be examined including the widespread corruption, cronyism, and stagnation 
among many of the states where uprisings took place. Based on this analysis this 
study will conclude that while many factors were at play in the Arab Spring and 
there was certainly a great deal of variability across borders, it was the driving 
forces of economic inequality, unpredictability, and stagnation which in large part 
drove people to the streets and in some cases autocrats out of power.  
This paper will begin in Chapter 2 with an overview of the Arab Spring 
uprisings across the region, including a detailed look at the economic precedents 
and policies which lead to widespread social discontent. In Chapter 3, this paper will 
address in greater detail the various competing explanations that have been 
provided across in the scholarly literature and the international media for the Arab 
Spring as well as why economic factors should be treated as primary. In Chapter 4, 
the critical economic factors will be more fully explained, as well as the historical 
economic corollaries that exist across the Middle East and North African region.  
Chapter 5 will show why economic factors had a primary contributing factor 
to the uprisings and how they continue to plague the same countries in the region. 
The analysis will focus on Tunisia and Egypt as a whole, as well as various 
                                                        
1 George Joffé, “The Arab Spring in North Africa: Origins and Prospects,” The Journal of North African 
Studies 16(December, 2011): 508, accessed January 5, 2015, doi: 10.1080/13629387.2011.630881. 
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demographic groups in the two countries. Chapter 6 will take a more forward 
looking approach to the findings of this study and address not only how economic 
factors greatly contributed to the Arab Spring uprisings but also continue to plague 
these nations. Finally, Chapter 7 will conclude this study with a summary review of 
the findings and the implications for further research.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Overview of the Arab Spring: Where Did It All Come From and What Exactly 
Happened? 
 
Muhammad Al-Bouazizi, “a poor, unemployed, economically and socially 
oppressed Tunisian” was a street vendor who, now famously and tellingly, 
performed an act of self-immolation on December 17, 2010 in the rural town of Sidi 
Bouzid, Tunisia, in protest of his subjugation and embarrassment at the hands of 
those in power.2 Before his act he told his mother, “blame the time [we live in] and 
not me”.3 This statement leaves the important question of exactly what time was he 
referring to and what was unique to this period in the Middle East and North Africa 
that drove him to perform such a drastic act? What was different about then as 
opposed to before? This action would serve as the catalyst “that would impeccably 
ignite not only the public square of Tunisia, but the streets of the other Arabic states 
[including] Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and 
Algeria”.4 There existed a great deal of civil unrest throughout the region with large 
populations of dissatisfied and long-subjugated citizens who had suffered 
economically, and it was Bouazizi who ignited this flame of revolution.  
Bouazizi was not, however, unique in his circumstance in the Middle East and 
North Africa. Most young people faced desperate and downtrodden lives, and while 
many had university degrees, in the face of no prospects for employment or 
                                                        
2 Najib George Awad, And Freedom Became a Public-Square: Political, Sociological and Religious 
Overviews on the Arab Christians and the Arabic Spring (Zurich: Lit Verlag GmbH & Co., 2012), 1. 
3 Mark Farha, “The Arab Revolts: Local, Regional, and Global Catalysts and Consequences,” in The 
Arab Uprisings: Catalysts, Dynamics, and Trajectories, ed. Fahed Al-Sumait, Nele Lenze, & Michael C. 
Hudson (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 48.  
4 Najib George Awad, And Freedom Became a Public-Square: Political, Sociological and Religious 
Overviews on the Arab Christians and the Arabic, 1. 
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advancement numerous young people would “spend their days loitering in the cafes 
lining the dusty streets of [these] impoverished towns”.5 Education did not lead to 
meaningful economic prospects and time appeared to whither away meaninglessly 
under the crushing tonnage of authoritarianism and economic stagnation. 
Additionally, this circumstance was in no way unique to Tunisia, and the overall 
unemployment rate among the Arab youth population was double the world 
average in the decade preceding the Arab Spring and remained little improved over 
that period.6  
Furthermore, “a mind-boggling fifty million jobs need to be created by 2020 
to fully absorb the young people due to come on to the labor market” not counting 
those already looking for work, an unlikely prospect which will be explicated in later 
chapters.7 While it is obvious where and when the revolution in strict terms began, 
the underlying large-scale facts and figures, which preceded the Arab Spring period, 
tell in more concrete terms why citizens chose then to finally revolt against long-
standing authoritarian regimes. In other words, the actions of Bouazizi and others 
like him did not exist in a vacuum nor without historical precedents and context. 
They were not the actions of a man swept up in hysteria but a calculated act based 
on long-standing economic grievances with his government.  
The Middle East and North Africa has long been a place of questionable 
human rights, low levels of freedom, and limited economic development for the 
                                                        
5 Rania Abouzeid, “Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire,” Time Magazine, January 
21, 2011, accessed January 6, 2015, 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html.  
6 Jean-Pierre Filiu, The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons From the Democratic Uprising (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 32.  
7 Jean-Pierre Filiu, The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons From the Democratic Uprising, 32. 
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majority of citizens. According to Freedom House, the entire Middle East and North 
African region is currently characterized by a dismal 2% freedom rating as a 
percentage of the population.8&9 With a regional population of over 405 million 
people that translates to about 8 million free people in the region, a decidedly bleak 
overall number. This is especially telling when compared to other regions of the 
world, as in Europe where 86% of the 614 million people are characterized as free, 
in Asia where 38% of the 3.9 billion people are considered free (a region which 
includes the failed and tyrannical state of North Korea and oppressive communist 
state of China), and the Americas where 71% of the 953 million people are 
characterized as free.10 Additionally, if taken as whole since the beginning of the 
Freedom House studies in January of 1973 until the present only one country has 
ever been granted ‘free’ status, Israel, with the vast majority landing in the ‘not free’ 
category and ever more regressing to that status as of recent.11  
Furthermore, the recent trends throughout the region have been less than 
encouraging, especially in the years immediately preceding and following the 
revolutions. The general movement globally in 2011 was a decline in freedom and 
the Middle East and North Africa, despite the protests, was not immune to this 
trend.12 This included not-free scores of 5.5/7 (with 7 being the worst possible 
                                                        
8 “Middle East and North Africa,” Freedom House, accessed January 5, 2015, 
https://freedomhouse.org/regions/middle-east-and-north-africa#.VKtZyMa4lBw.  
9 These data can be further explored in the appendix under Figure 2.1. 
10 “Country Ratings and Status by Region, FIW 1973-2014,” Freedom House, accessed January 2, 
2015, freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VKtakFpSxIl. 
11 “Country Ratings and Status by Region, FIW 1973-2014,” Freedom House, accessed January 1, 
2015, freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VKtakFpSxIl.  
12 David J. Kramer & Arch Puddington, “The Arab Spring and Freedom’s Future,” Freedom House, 
January 18, 2012, accessed January 8, 2015, https://freedomhouse.org/blog/arab-spring-and-
freedom’s-future#.VLFZ-8a4lBw.  
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score) for the vast majority of Middle Eastern and North African states for not only 
the years prior to the 2011 uprisings but also the years after, with very few showing 
any meaningful upward trend.13 While the scope of political development and 
change for the region in the years after the revolution is for the most part outside 
the realm of this study, it is important to understand just how oppressive the region 
was and continues to be for most citizens.  
Economically, the same lack of opportunity and freedom existed and 
continues to exist throughout the Middle East and North Africa, especially when 
compared to other global regions. The 2014 Index of Economic Freedom, published 
jointly by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, gave the Middle East 
and North Africa an overall economic freedom score of 61.4 out of a possible 100, a 
number which was in many ways artificially bolstered by the very high rankings 
bestowed on the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain.14 In general, North 
Africa ranked exceptionally low with all states scoring in the 50-59.9 and the 
Arabian Peninsula scored marginally better with more states, such as Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, Israel scoring in the 60-69.9 bracket.15&16 What these numbers in their 
simplest form show is the general conditions of limited economic opportunity that 
existed prior to the Arab Spring and continues to exist across the region, especially 
in countries where protests and uprisings took place.  
Furthermore, what these telling statistics and analysis from Freedom House 
                                                        
13 “Country Ratings and Status by Region, FIW 1973-2014,” Freedom House, accessed January 2, 
2015, freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VKtakFpSxIl. 
14 “2014 Economic Freedom Heat Map,” Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation & The 
Wall Street Journal, accessed January 6, 2015, http://www.heritage.org/index/heatmap.  
15 “2014 Economic Freedom Heat Map,” Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation & The 
Wall Street Journal, accessed January 6, 2015, http://www.heritage.org/index/heatmap. 
16 These data can be further explored in the appendix under Figure 2.2. 
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and Index of Economic Freedom serve to show is how overtly subjugated the 
majority of citizens who live in the Middle East and North Africa were and continue 
to be. It would be wrong, however, to overly focus on the sole catalyzing power of 
these praetorian states. While the statistics are telling, there is far more nuance to 
be discovered underneath these large and simple numerical characterizations. 
However, a fuller exploration of the economic factors at play will be presented in 
Chapter 4. 
We may ask, what exactly happened across the region? Where and how did 
people revolt? What did they want? Revolution is seldom a simple affair and 
demands and circumstances certainly vary across borders and between people. As 
was explained earlier, the Arab Spring began in a small rural town south of Tunisia 
and quickly spread throughout the region. Next the revolution moved to Egypt, 
which suffered from many of the same systemic maladies as Tunisia. From Egypt 
“protests sprang up elsewhere in the Arab World from the Persian Gulf to North 
Africa” and even led to the killing of longtime and despotic Libyan leader Muammar 
al-Gadhafi.17 A region long known as impenetrable to the westernization and 
liberalization of its policies and economic systems was going through a decided shift 
in its politics and policies at the hands of angry and motivated citizens.  
 Additionally, voices from those protesting further capture the wants of the 
Arab Spring. As the BBC reported in December 2011 in extensive interviews with 
protestors of various demographics, socioeconomic statuses, and nationalities 
across the Middle East and North Africa, there were numerous telling quotes of 
                                                        
17 Mark L. Haas & David W. Lesch, “Introduction,” in The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the 
Middle East, ed. Mark L. Haas & David W. Lesch (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013), 2.  
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wants and expectations.  
Ahmed Raafat Amin age 22 of Cairo, Egypt stated,  
“Our country's condition was getting worse and worse. There was 
corruption, torture, injustice, inequality and no freedom […] the regime 
succeeded in isolating us as individuals for years. Once we stopped thinking 
as individuals and started thinking as a group, change became possible […] 
we need […] more jobs and development plans”.18 
 
Similarly, Aiman Abubaker Ahmed Abushahna age 43 of Misrata, Libya stated, 
 
“On 19 February, I felt something was going to happen - the revolution was 
definitely coming […] we do not need any more corruption nor more 
destruction of this country […] all I want is a happy future when my children 
live in a democratic country where they will be safe and free”.19 
 
Additionally, Amel Gaaloul (no age given) of Tunis, Tunisia argued,  
 
“We're all very happy that Ben Ali has left the country. We're singing and 
dancing. We were hoping he would leave earlier but at least he is gone […] 
we are now hoping for a fair and transparent government. Anything can 
happen now”.20 
 
What these expressive statements capture is not only the wants of the protestors 
but also their hopes and dreams for the future. For too long suffering, stagnation, 
and a lack of social mobility had been the norm, and at long last change was a real 
possibility. As Woodrow Wilson once stated, “the seed of revolution is repression,” 
and this seed was finally beginning to blossom in this long economically repressive 
region.  
                                                        
18 Dhruti Shah, “The Big Stories Affecting You in 2011,” BBC News Middle East, last modified 
December 26, 2011, accessed January 8, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
16275176. 
19 Dhruti Shah, “The Big Stories Affecting You in 2011,” BBC News Middle East, last modified 
December 26, 2011, accessed January 8, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
16275176.  
20 “Tunisians React as President Steps Down,” BBC News Africa, last modified January 14, 2011, 
accessed January 8, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12196242.  
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Furthermore, there were certain groups throughout the region who had been 
subjected to deplorable economic conditions and bleak social prospects, notably the 
youth population. The political impact of the youth in the Middle East and North 
Africa should not be taken lightly as there exists a dramatic youth bulge, the largest 
one in the world when compared to other regions.21 Statistically, in Tunisia over 42 
percent of the population is under 25, in Libya this number is 48 percent, it is 51 
percent in Egypt, and 57 percent in Syria.22 Furthermore, youth bulges were 
especially pronounced in states “that experienced the most widespread and 
powerful protests during the Arab Spring.23 Later in the case studies section of 
Chapter 5 the important correlative power of economic factors and their impact on 
the region’s youths will be more fully explored, especially the driving power of 
economic dejection on a highly educated and employable youth population. 
However, as the Arab Youth Survey published by the A’SDAA and Burston-
Martseller argues, “it can be argued that the decisive factor – the tipping point – that 
triggered regional unrest stems from the continuing fallout of the global financial 
crisis”.24 
For now, however, it is important to fully understand the mindset of the 
Middle East and North African region’s youths prior to the onset of the Arab Spring. 
ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller has conducted numerous telling Arab Youth Surveys in 
the years before as well as the years after the Arab Spring. For now a focus on the 
                                                        
21 Mark L. Haas & David W. Lesch, “Introduction,” in The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the 
Middle East, ed. Mark L. Haas & David W. Lesch (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013), 3.  
22 Mark L. Haas & David W. Lesch, “Introduction,” 3. 
23 Mark L. Haas & David W. Lesch, “Introduction,” 3. 
24 ASDA’A Burson- Marsteller Arab Youth Survey, “Third Annual ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab 
Youth Survey: Arab Youth Survey 2010/2011,” last modified 2011, accessed March 1, 2015, 
http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/2010/files/AYS_2010_white_paper.pdf. 
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attitudes and opinions of Arab Youths before the revolution will be focused on, 
while the changes, similarities, and differences in opinions after the revolution being 
discussed in a later Chapter, after a full exposition of the different means which 
propagated the revolutions is undertaken. In the 2009-2010 Arab Youth Survey 
numerous sentiments were captured which show the growing discontent Arab 
Youths had with their place in society.  
Young people in the entire Arab world were negatively affected by the global 
financial crisis of 2008, parts of which do not remain fully recovered to this very 
day.25 This was especially true for the youth population of North Africa where they 
felt the affects of the economic downturn the hardest, especially in the realms of 
employment and the ability to accrue savings without accumulating personal debt.26 
Further proving this, among the concerns Arab Youths had going forward, the top 
three in 2009-2010, for surveys administered in late 2009, on the eve of the Arab 
Spring were the rising cost of living, a shortage of affordable housing, and 
unemployment.27 There was a palpable fear of economic stagnation and of slipping 
into abject poverty, and the policies of the various governments throughout the 
region only perpetuated these anxieties.  
Shown in the 2010-2011 Arab Youth Survey, for surveys administered in mid 
to late 2010, immediately before the beginning of the Arab Spring, these anxious 
attitudes of Arab youths continued to grow. The substantial concern regarding the 
                                                        
25 ASDA’A Burson- Marsteller Arab Youth Survey. “2nd Annual White Paper,” last modified 2010, 
accessed January 8, 2015, 
http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/2009/downloads/asdaa_whitepaper_online.pdf. 
26 “2nd Annual White Paper,” 9. 
27 “2nd Annual White Paper,” 13. 
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rising cost of living was persistent and was especially severe in Egypt, where 77% 
showed grave concern, as well as Bahrain, where 68% responded with worry.28 
Furthermore, similarly to the 2009-2010 survey there remained a high concern 
regarding unemployment as well as the economy in general in 2010-2011.29 The 
ASDA’A went so far as to argue, “it can be argued that the decisive factor – the 
tipping point – that triggered regional unrest stems from the continuing fallout of 
the global financial crisis”.30 This argument further captures the growing discontent 
large segments of the population had with the economic policies of their 
governments in the years preceding the Arab Spring. So while indeed the uprisings 
took on a rapid and unpredictable nature, there were certainly a great many 
concerns which had been developing and perpetuating for years throughout the 
Middle East and North Africa which propagated the decision to revolt.  
To fully grasp a study about a regional revolution it is equally important to 
grasp where the revolutions were successful, where they were not, and why. James 
L. Gelvin, a professor of History at the University of California, Los Angeles has 
identified four clusters of results from the Arab Spring. The first of which consists of 
Tunisia and Egypt, “where militaries, siding with protestors and not with autocrats, 
eased the ouster of the latter from power”.31 This was further bolstered by both 
states having relatively powerful militaries, with Egypt’s being the largest in the 
                                                        
28 “Third Annual ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey, Top 10 Findings,” last Modified 
March 15, 2011, accessed January 8, 2015, 
http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/2010/files/AYS_2010_white_paper.pdf.  
29 “Third Annual ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey, Top 10 Findings,” 14.  
30 “Third Annual ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey, Top 10 Findings” 16.  
31 James L. Gelvin, “The Arab World,” in The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East, ed. 
Mark L. Haas & David W. Lesch (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013), 247.  
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Arab World.32 In these states the Army stood against Mubarak and Ben Ali resulting 
in a more rapid and complete removal from power and transfer of leadership. This 
does not mean, however, that these revolutions were caused by the militaries. 
Conversely, the militaries simply aided in the transition of power. The second 
cluster identified by Gelvin includes areas where “regimes fragmented, pitting the 
officers and soldiers, cabinet minister, politicians, and diplomats who stood with the 
regime against those who joined the opposition”.33 States where this took place 
include Yemen and Libya, both characteristically “weak states” where decidedly 
weak national identities existed and continue to be virtually nonexistent.34 The lack 
of any strong nationalistic sentiments caused a much easier fragmentation of the 
dissatisfied populace and the lasting effects continue to the present where Libya 
remains in a state of political turmoil and in Yemen the government collapsed on 
January 23, 2015.35  
The third cluster, identified by Gelvin, includes Algeria, Syria, and Bahrain 
“where regimes maintained their cohesion against the uprisings”.36 What these 
three regimes had in common was a cohesion within the ruling coalition that was 
able to respond and remove factional elements while avoiding any splintering 
within the government. In other words, the ability to maintain cohesion and placate 
the angry populaces with economic entitlements allowed these states to avoid the 
fates of those states in clusters one and two. The fourth and final cluster, as argued 
                                                        
32 James L. Gelvin, “The Arab World,” 247. 
33 James L. Gelvin, “The Arab World,” 247. 
34 James L. Gelvin, “The Arab World,” 248.  
35 Shuab Almosawa & Rod Nordland, “U.S. Fears Chaos as Government of Yemen Falls,” The New York 
Times, January 22, 2015, accessed January 24, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/world/middleeast/yemen-houthi-crisis-sana.html?_r=0.  
36 James L. Gelvin, “The Arab World,” 249.  
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for by Gelvin, includes states in which there was no overthrow of the government. 
Additionally, in these cases using the word ‘uprising’ would a fallacy, as they were 
more protests than anything else in which citizens demanded change and not an 
overthrow of the current regime.37 Not surprisingly the remaining states which fit 
into this cluster include five of the seven remaining monarchies in the Middle East 
and North Africa: Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman. This notion has 
been further contended for by respected sociologist and political scientist Jack A. 
Goldstone who argues, that in these monarchical states blame was shifted adeptly to 
prime ministers and other government officials and not the monarch, thus 
insulating the monarchs from protesters and their demands.38 Put more simply, the 
monarchs acting as chief of state were able to pass the buck to their political chiefs 
of government.  
What this four-part typology by Gelvin demonstrates is the differentiation in 
results across borders that occurred during and after the Arab Spring across the 
Middle East and North African region.39 While certainly there was not a uniformity 
of result, there was still a common reasoning for revolution from the eyes of many 
protestors, especially those in states where the revolutions were successful. In 
general, what the Arab Spring has reaffirmed is “the importance of people power, 
the sense that taking to the streets and demanding change can really make a 
difference, and that the powerful are so only as long as people believe they are 
                                                        
37 James L. Gelvin, “The Arab World,” 249. 
38 Jack A. Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle 
Eastern Autocracies,” Foreign Affairs (May-June 2011), accessed January 8, 2015, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67694/jack-a-goldstone/understanding-the-revolutions-of-
2011.  
39 These data can be further explored in the appendix under Figure 2.3.  
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untouchable”.40  
Finally, one must be careful not to paint the Middle East and North African 
region with the brush of uniformity. There is a great amount of variance culturally, 
civically, and religiously, especially between the ideological conservatives, 
pragmatic conservatives, and liberal Islamists, as well as secularists, across the 
region. These important variances both across and within borders well help 
determine the difference between states in the case studies section in Chapter 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
40 Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), vii.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Why should Economic Factors be Considered as Primary? 
 
Since 2011 there has been a surge of arguments presented by scholars and 
members of the international media attempting to explain the causes of the Arab 
Spring. Many of these alternative explanations will be presented in this chapter to 
aid the reader in fully digesting the complexity of the regional revolution and it is 
additionally not the goal of this study to refute any single one. However, as later case 
studies and figures will illuminate, the importance of the preceding economic 
factors in starting the revolution must not only not be ignored but are also among 
the most important.  
The first and perhaps most popular argument for what caused the Arab 
Spring was the power of social media, especially in the hands of technologically 
savvy youth. The Internet is certainly a uniquely mobile and rapid tool through the 
wide use of the multitude of different mobile and home based devices. Beginning 
with research conducted in 2009-2010, “More than 80% (of Middle Eastern youths) 
used the Internet at least several times a week, and 56% claim[ed] to surf the web 
every day. Only 6% of Arab youth say they never use the Internet.”41 Additionally, 
according to the Arab Youth Survey, “social media is becoming increasingly 
influential [and] more young Arabs are getting their news from social media while 
trust in websites and social media as reliable news sources has risen sharply”.42 
Some studies have gone so far as to characterize social media as directly responsible 
                                                        
41 “2nd Annual White Paper,” 18.  
42 “Third Annual ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey, Top 10 Findings,” Last modified 
2013.  
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for the Arab Spring, characterizing the Arab Spring fallaciously as a “Facebook 
Revolution”.43  
However, while social media and communication technology more generally 
certainly aided citizens in communicating their wants, opinions, and protest 
locations, and the ability to rapidly communicate and work around government-
imposed censorship measures can assist in perpetuating or igniting a revolution. 
These technologies were not developed for purposes of people’s protest in the first 
place. It is also important to keep in mind that large segments of the population that 
participated in the revolutions did not engage actively in social media, especially the 
older class of citizens. In this sense social media and its related technologies are 
more complementary and not causal. As Wolfsfeld et al. argued in a recent 
International Journal of Press and Politics article, 
“social media may function to sustain and facilitate collective action, but this 
only one channel of communications among many, and processes of political 
communications cannot be regarded as a fundamental driver of unrest 
compared to other structural factors”.44 
 
This is shown to be the case if we compare states where the revolutions were 
successful with those in which major protests did not take place. In the Gulf states, 
where uprisings, if they occurred, were not successful in overthrowing the 
incumbent governments, “social media were used by protesters as by the regimes, 
arguably even more so than in Egypt, Tunisia, or Syria”.45 This is especially true 
given the much higher standard of living and increased wealth in these Gulf oil-
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producing states. Social media, Internet, and cell phone use were rampant and yet 
no toppling of a regime occurred. In other words, the necessary driving precursor 
for action did not exist in the wealthy states within the Middle East and North 
African region. 
Additionally, an alternative explanation for the Arab Spring has been a focus 
simply on the relative size of the youth population throughout the region. While it is 
indeed true that there is a notable youth bulge, as was show earlier in Chapter 2, 
this, similar to social media and information technology, takes on a primarily 
complementary role. It was not the mere fact that many protesters were young, it 
was the demands they had as a result of their often-humiliating treatment by 
authoritarian regimes coupled with increased access to education which was the 
catalyzing factor. They were demanding economic empowerment and did so with a 
great deal of youthful energy and zeal.46 In other words, undoubtedly having a great 
many young people marching, protesting, and demanding change aided in toppling a 
number of regimes. However, it was not the simple fact that they were young which 
brought about this transformation.  
A third explanation for the onset of the Arab Spring is the well-known 
contagion effect, in which revolution spreads like a virus from population to 
population regardless of demands.47 Especially interesting and thought provoking 
has been the causal linkage between social media and the contagion effect at the 
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accessed January 24, 2015, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2011/02/political_and_market_turmoil.  
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hands of young people. Some have argued that it was ideas through social media 
that jumped at literal light speed across borders from computer screen to computer 
screen illuminating populations to their plights and igniting a revolutionary spirit 
rapidly. However, while indeed ideas and values were shared though various media 
outlets, what this argument fails to account for is why this time came as the one 
where revolution finally occurred. Values had been shared for decades in coffee 
shops and cafes across the region and certainly citizens were unhappy with 
numerous aspects of their lives before the advent of widespread social media. 
However, this was not the causal factor as some have argued, it was a contributing 
one. 
A final alternative explanation which has been proposed for the onset of the 
Arab Spring is that citizens, especially in states where the revolutions were 
successful, were simply dismayed with their long-standing autocratic political 
leaders. As examples, Hosni Mubarak had been in power in Egypt since 1980, Ben 
Ali in Tunisia since 1987, and Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya for over 42 years. As a 
2012 report presented by a bipartisan subcommittee of the British Parliament 
argued, the revolution was brought about by, 
“resentment of authoritarian rulers that had denied freedom of expression 
and limited opportunities for participation in civil and political life; long-
standing 'emergency laws'; a malfunctioning or absent justice system; and a 
repressive security state apparatus that was responsible for myriad human 
rights abuses, including torture and killings”.48 
 
This explanation provides the most persuasive competing causal explanation of the 
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root cause of the Arab Spring when compared to the economic causes. However, as 
will be shown in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, it was indeed economic factors that were 
primary and social/political factors were secondary as major concerns, especially 
given the bleak economic prospects and a constant of economic repressiveness, 
corruption, and cronyism within each government.  
Moreover, recent global precedent existed for action and revolution, and as 
the previous section demonstrates many scholars and members of the media have 
found alternative explanations to explain this sudden shift. However, the economic 
conditions, which existed in the Middle East and North African region in the years 
prior to 2011, especially in Tunisia and Egypt, contributed significantly to the Arab 
Spring and are likely to continue to plague this region in the coming years unless 
serious reform measures are taken.  
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Chapter 4 
 
What Exactly Are Economic Factors: The Mix of Macro and Micro 
 
 Certainly the very term ‘economics’ brings up a tremendous number of 
complex statistics and an even larger number of complicated formulae. This paper’s 
goal, as it a fully qualitative political science paper, is not to explain the 
methodologies and mathematics behind economic variables. Instead, it is a targeted 
use and understanding of a plethora of diverse statistics that will fully demonstrate 
the importance of economic grievances in promulgating the Arab Spring. 
Additionally, it is important to illuminate and reason a number of these variables to 
provide the academic and scholarly background to follow the arguments provided 
later in the case studies section. What this chapter will focus on is a targeted 
selection of macro and micro economic variables and utilize these to fully showcase 
the situation in the Middle East and North African region prior to the advent of the 
Arab Spring, and thus fully demonstrate the vast importance of economic variables 
in providing the impetus for action in the Arab Spring.  
 The important question to address now is why economic variables? What 
was uniquely empowering and dire about the economic situations in the Middle East 
and North Africa that would lead to widespread revolts and protests challenging 
long-standing powerful and entrenched regimes? As Ilhem Allagui and Johanne 
Kuebler of the International Journal of Communication argue, the citizens in the 
region were mobilized as a result of “the pain they shared due to difficult 
socioeconomic conditions [specifically] unemployment [and] inequalities among 
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classes”.49  
Furthermore, as Nadia Hassine of the World Bank argues, “deteriorating 
standards of living, high and rising unemployment, and growing perceptions of 
exclusion were among the many reasons that prompted the Arab streets to rise in 
early 2011”.50 There existed, since the large-scale state economic planning of the 
1980s, a long and predictable path to “inequality of opportunity in economic” 
prospects as well as great deal of economic disparity across rural-urban borders 
and between socioeconomic groups.51 In other words, North Africa and the Middle 
East before the Arab Spring was a highly unequal place with a very small number of 
haves and an ever-growing number of have-nots. Logically, it was the increased 
feeling of subjugation at the hands of self-serving and autocratic governments the 
provided the main impetus for action for many citizens across the region. Simply 
put, the “Arab revolutions were fueled by poverty, unemployment, and [a] lack of 
economic opportunity”.52  
Thus fully understanding the vast income and economic inequality that 
existed historically, especially in the decade preceding the uprisings, throughout the 
region is vital to understanding what started the revolutions and protests. Based on 
this understanding the World Bank argues, “high inequality threatens a country’s 
political stability because more people are dissatisfied with their economic status, 
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which makes it harder to reach political consensus among population groups with 
higher and lower incomes”.53 In general the Middle East and North African region 
was a challenging place to live and find meaningful work, had the highest rates of 
youth unemployment in the world when compared to any other region54, and the 
lowest youth labor participation globally.55&56 
Facundo Alverado and Thomas Piketty of the Paris School of Economics 
pointed out, “there is no doubt that income inequality is extremely large at the level 
of the Middle East taken as whole [and] the share of total Middle East income 
accruing to the top 10% income receivers is currently 55%” leaving 45% of the 
regions citizens with vastly less available income.57 When this fact is then taken in 
conjunction with a selection of pre-Arab Spring Gini coefficients the true degree of 
inequality in the region begins to take shape. The values of the Gini coefficient range 
from ‘0’ representing perfect equality to ‘1’ representing perfect inequality. To take 
as a point of reference the state with the worst current global Gini coefficient is 
Namibia, in Western Africa, with a rating of .59 as of 2010 followed by Zambia, in 
Southern Central Africa, with a rating of .57 as of 2010 as well.58 Conversely, the 
states with the most equal Gini ratings are all located in Northern Europe, and 
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include Norway and Denmark, which both have scores of .25, as well as Sweden and 
Finland, which have scores of .26.59  
The Middle East and North African region, when compared to these 
extremes, was certainly an unequal place based on their respective Gini coefficients. 
Egypt and Tunisia, both of which will be treated in more detail later, had average 
Gini coefficients of .308 and .377 respectively in the five years preceding the Arab 
Spring, which is a high-medium ranking of inequality.60 Additionally, Morocco’s was 
.409 as of 2008, Yemen’s was .377 as of 2005, Algeria’s was .355 as of 1995, and Iran 
was .445 as of 200661 all of which also fall in the high-medium ranking of inequality, 
especially when compared to their global peers.62 What this regional snapshot fully 
captures is the absence of any states where a good deal of income equality existed. 
The vast majority of citizens in the Middle East and North African region were stuck 
in downtrodden economic situations for decades prior to the onset of the Arab 
Spring and were unable to improve their personal economic standing. This, while 
the rich and powerful, especially each state’s political elite, continued to increase 
their vast wealth. 
Another telling statistic for the lack of economic opportunity in the Middle 
East and North Africa prior to the onset of the Arab Spring is the per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) figures as well as the poverty rates among the citizenry. As 
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a starting point it is certainly true that across the many states throughout the Middle 
East and North Africa there is a great disparity with how each individual economy 
functions, whether it be driven by oil, natural gas, tourism, manufacturing, or a host 
of other industries. However, this uniqueness of each state’s economy does not 
remove the overall trend of decidedly low per capita GDP figures, and the 
combination of this statistic with high levels of income inequality only exacerbates 
the case for the lack of economic opportunity for the majority of the region’s 
citizens. In other words, not only were the vast majority of citizens extremely poor 
but they also continually looked at the few wealthy of each state gain more and 
more economic power and influence.  
After the removal of Qatar’s GDP per capita, which stands in 2013 at a global 
leading $102,900 and United Arab Emirates, which also stands relatively high at 
$42,000, the rest of the region was decidedly bleak prior to the onset of the Arab 
Spring (two states where there were little to no protests).63 Beyond these regional 
outliers, the rest of the Middle East and North African state’s GDP per capita figures 
were extremely low. Important examples from 2009 include: Yemen with $1,252 
per capita, Egypt with $2,461 per capita, Algeria with $3,771 per capita, Libya with 
$10,455 per capita, Morocco with $2,861 per capita, and Syria with $2,065.64&65 This 
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is especially revealing when compared to the global average in 2009 of $10,400.66 
Additionally the per capita GDP figures taken five years before in 2005 illuminate a 
trend of lack of real development and economic opportunity for these state’s 
citizens. 
In 2005 Yemen’s GDP per capita stood at $831, Egypt with $1,249, Algeria 
with $3,038, Libya with $7,864, Morocco with $1,948, and Syria with $1,588.67 This 
is once again revealing when compared to the global average in 2005, which stood 
at $9,500.68 Moreover, when the entire developing nations of the Middle East and 
North Africa are taken in conjunction the average GNI per capita in 2009 stood at 
$3,456.6970 While indeed on its façade there was a bit of economic growth in the 
region over those five years, what is masked is the way in which the increased 
growth was not only distributed throughout each state but also the still bleak 
overall per capita figures. What the Gini coefficients from the region show, is that 
despite general economic growth the new monies being invested into these 
economies were not finding their way into the hands of the citizens which 
desperately needed them. 
Based on the Gini coefficient and GDP per capita the basic picture of the lack 
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of meaningful economic development and opportunity in the Middle East and North 
African region is quite notable. Furthermore, what captures an even more telling 
snapshot of the challenging preceding economic situation is the poverty and 
unemployment rates throughout the region. While there are numerous metrics to 
consider while calculating poverty rates, including what constitutes a reasonable 
per-day income. For the purposes of this study the accepted figure of earning less 
that $5 per day and $2.5 per day, as proposed by the World Bank and United 
Nations, will be utilized. 
As the World Bank data shows, numerous states in the Middle East and North 
Africa exist in a state of abject poverty. As of 2005, 61 million of Egypt’s 71 million 
citizens lived of less than $5 per day, a poverty rate of over 85%. This number failed 
to improve in 2008 where over 63 million of the country’s 75 million citizens lived 
off less than $5 per day, a poverty rate of over 84%.71 Additionally when the poverty 
figure of less that $2.5 dollars per day is taken the situation remained equally as 
bleak, with 37% of the Egyptian population in 2005 and 32% of the population in 
2007 living below this level.72 The situation around the entire region follows this 
pattern. In 2005 in Yemen, the last time data was sampled for this state, 18 million 
of the country’s 20.1 million citizens lived on less than $5 per day, a poverty rate of 
90%.73 When $2.5 a day instead of $5 per day is taken the figures remained equally 
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bleak, with a poverty rate of 53%, or around 10 million Yemeni citizens.74 
Similarly in Morocco as of 2007, 20.3 million of the state’s 30.6 million 
citizens lived on less than $5 per day, a poverty rate of 66%.75 When $2.5 is used, 7.6 
million Moroccans, or 25% of the population, lived bellow the poverty line.76 
Additionally in 2004 in Syria, the most recent available date of measure, 12.9 million 
of the over 17 million Syrian citizens lived in poverty bellow $5 a day, a deplorable 
rate of 73%, and 29% lived on less than $2.5 a day.77 In Jordan as of 2006, the 
poverty rate for those living on less than $5 stood at 49% and increased in 2009 to 
50% and improved slightly to 42% in 2010.78 Here the rate of those living on less 
than $2.5 per day was notably better, averaging 6% from 2006 to 2010.79 However, 
this does not negate the still very high levels of overall poverty throughout the 
country. Additionally, what these graphs created by the World Bank showcase in 
telling fashion is the continued rise in the number of millions of poor people living in 
the Middle East and North African region over the past more than 25 years, 
specifically those living on less that $5 dollars a day and has remained relatively flat 
for those living on less that $2.5 a day. 80 
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  81 82 
What this telling sampling of poverty statistics demonstrates is just how 
bleak the economic situations for the vast majority of the citizens in the Middle East 
and North African region was, especially in those states that were subject to massive 
protests, uprisings, and regime changes. Additionally, there are numerous 
devastating effects that can result from such pervasive low levels of income. 
According to the United Nations Millennium Project those living in poverty suffer 
from a lack of basic health care, higher rates of disease, malnutrition, lack of social 
mobility, diminished prospects for personal growth, social frustration, as well as 
many others.83 What this linkage highlights is the true mobilizing and devastating 
effect a lack of economic growth and prospects can have on a population of citizens, 
and nowhere was this truer than in the Middle East and North Africa before the 
onset of the Arab Spring. Simply put, the vast majority of the citizens in this region 
were extraordinarily poor and when coupled with the high levels of inequality, as 
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demonstrated by the Gini coefficient, and sluggish economic prospects, as argued for 
in with the GDP per capita data, the entire region’s economic prospects were 
deplorable and stagnated.  
A final statistic to consider in showing the role of economic factors in 
promulgating the Arab Spring is the extremely high unemployment rates that 
existed in the many years prior to the onset of the uprisings. Regionally speaking, in 
2010, “MENA recorded the highest unemployment rate of any region in the world 
[and] [further] escalating unemployment and inflation became universally 
observable forces of strain”.84 To start, in Syria in 2005 the unemployment rate 
stood at 9.2% and worsened in 2008 to 10.9% and in 2011 worsened even more to 
11.5%.85 Similarly in Morocco in 2005 the unemployment rate was 11% and 
improved marginally to 9.6% in 2008 before settling at 9% in 2011 on the eve of the 
revolution.86 Moreover, this pattern continues for all of the developing states in the 
Middle East and North Africa.  
In Jordan in 2005 the unemployment rate stood at 14.9% and improved 
slightly to 12.7% in 2008 before rising to 12.9% in 2011.87 Additionally in Algeria in 
2005 the unemployment rate was 15.3% before improving slightly to 11.3% in 2008 
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and settling at 10% before the uprisings broke out.88 The pattern of extraordinarily 
high rates of unemployment continues in Libya, a state which did have a marginally 
high GDP per capita rate when compared to its peers. However, in 2005 the rate 
stood at 19.8% remained relatively unchanged in 2008 falling to 19.1% and 
decreased slightly to 18.2% in 2011, meaning not much of country’s GDP was 
filtering to many of the citizens, especially those who were without jobs.89 
Moreover, in Yemen the disastrous pattern of high unemployment rates 
continued with 16.1% of the population being out of work in 2005, 15% in 2008, 
and 17.7% in 2011.90 What these unemployment statistics prove is the general lack 
of well-paying and stable jobs in the region.91 Unemployment has the distinct ability 
to drain hopefulness, energy, and drive out of a country’s citizens. As Jonathan 
Wadsworth, a labor economist at the London School of Economics, argues, “people 
are hit particularly hard by the economic and emotional effects of unemployment 
[…] [and] the longer the period of unemployment, the bigger the effect”.92 
Now that a plethora of important large scale economic statistics have been 
analyzed, this study will now introduce a number of non-regional and 
complementary examples of revolutions and uprisings in which similarly 
challenging economic situations existed for the majority of citizens so as to further 
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prove the validity of these measures. However, the goal of this subsection is not to 
simply argue that economic factors were the causation of these other non-period 
revolution, but to introduce a broader base of examples to aid in realizing the 
mobilizing power economic grievances can have across history and regions. This is 
also not to say that the economic challenges identified in these non-linear instances 
are the same as other economic factors that precipitated other revolutions and 
hyperinflation, increased and unfair taxation, staple-good shortages are just a few of 
these elements. However, no matter the grievance identified, they fall under the 
overarching and powerful umbrella of economic factors and have a decided impact 
on a given country’s citizenry.  
The first of these examples were the economic situation in the lead up to the 
American Revolutionary War (1776) French Revolution (1789). While certainly 
there have been a plethora of well-reasoned scholarly arguments regarding the 
root-causes of these two revolutions, it is the goal of this section to merely 
illuminate the often strong correlation between a population’s economic grievances 
and popular uprisings. Indeed strong cases can be made that either of these 
revolutions were social, political, and cultural in nature, however, economics played 
a large role in both and this understanding adds to the overall persuasiveness of the 
argument for the preponderance and importance of economics in the Arab Spring. 
In other words, historical linkages add to the modern interpretation.  
The American Revolution, as argued for by noted Columbia University 
Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, was caused by colonists “hurt financially by the 
new policy of strict imperial control” and thus “[a] major emphasis [was] placed 
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upon the clashing of economic interests”.93 Now certainly a great many historical 
scholars have contended that there were other causes for the American Revolution 
than economics, especially political foundations. However, it cannot be denied that 
the clash of American colonists, especially the “disenfranchised proletariat” of 
farmers, shopkeepers, and the like, with their mother country over economic issues 
was a decisive part of the appeal to engage in a revolution.94 The simple call for ‘No 
Taxation without Representation’ is at its center an economic grievance coupled 
with a political solution.  
In the events of the now famous Boston Tea Party in 1773 the colonists’ 
anger and frustration with the economic situation at the hands of their British 
overlords came to a full head and “the British trading company became the 
involuntary host at a tea party costing 15,000 pounds”.95 This was a culminating 
result of the prevailing English economic theory of mercantilism, which “utilized the 
colonies as an economic appendage of the mother country” and was meant to keep 
overseas economies fully subordinate to England.96 This in turn caused a great deal 
of predictable frustration and strife within the colonies. Simply put, the colonists 
were discontented with their economic subjugation by the crown. A parallel shared 
by both the Tunisian and Egyptian populaces, and something which will be fully 
explained in the next chapter. 
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In other words, the removing of the perceived dictatorial, tyrannical, and 
overbearing leader, in King George III, was the political solution to the economic 
problems faced by the American colonists. From this there is a distinct similarity to 
the cases of the Arab Spring, where a removal of the perceived problem of out of 
touch and corrupt leaders was the solution to the region’s citizen’s economic woes. 
Simply put, the English government exerted absolute control over the limited 
American economy, banned the importation and exportation of certain goods, and 
artificially limited the full productivity of the American populace, thus 
disenfranchising a great many citizens and propagating their calls to revolt.97 As 
historian Herbert L Osgood, a leading figure in the imperial school of American 
history, aptly argues, “what was true of the American Revolution must be true in the 
case of any other similar movement”.98  
Another notable case, which adds to this historical correlation, is the 
economic grievances held by the French citizenry in the lead up to the 1789 
revolution. Additionally, similar to the American Revolution, there are a plethora of 
well-reasoned arguments for different underlying causes for the French Revolution. 
However, as has become a notable and predicable pattern there were a number of 
significant economic factors which led to the French citizens deciding to revolt 
against the crown. As noted scholar Florin Aftalion of Cambridge University argues, 
“the direct cause of the French Revolution was the inability of the Royal Treasury to 
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resolve its problems” which included the “state living beyond its means since the 
beginning of the seventeenth century”.99 Similarly, C.E. Labrousse, the leading 
French authority on the economic history of the Old Regime and the Revolution, 
argues, “the financial consequences of that long pre-Revolutionary recession and the 
Revolutionary economic crisis were grave […] as a result of the recession and the 
crisis […] the amount which the taxpayer was paying became too heavy a 
burden”.100  
What this translated to for the majority of the French population was a 
system of taxation which was both “complex and inequitable”.101 In this 
arrangement of taxation nobles and clergy were exempt and the rest fell on the 
‘third estate’.102 What this disproportionate burdening did was create a vast amount 
of inequality within the state, something shared by a number of modern states 
before the Arab Spring shown through the Gini index. So while the wealthy and 
powerful enjoyed a privileged and legally protected position in society, the vast 
majority of French Citizens were left to pay the burdensome debts accumulated by 
the royal government, all this while the royals and their close confidants maintained 
lavish and opulent lifestyles (a strong parallel shared by the Mubarak and Ben Ali 
regimes). Simply put, “what produced this crisis and made it so serious” was a 
combination of a plethora of economic frustrations including perceived arbitrary 
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subjugation and a lack of upward social mobility.103 Something shared by not only 
the American populace on the eve of the American Revolution but a great many 
citizens in the Middle East and North Africa on the eve of the Arab Spring.  
In sum, there is little doubt, based on the economic factors identified earlier 
in this chapter as well as through historical linkages that economic factors can and 
do have a powerful motivating ability for a population. In the case of the Arab Spring 
it was indeed these economic grievances that contributed significantly to the 
popular uprising and call for change. Simply put, people were frustrated and 
dismayed with the general lack of economic opportunity their government allowed 
for them. Levels of education correlated weakly to economic advancement and 
people were often locked into low paying socioeconomic classes. The long 
downward trajectory of economic growth, a lack of upward mobility, and a corrupt 
economic system perpetuated problems which could only be remedied by a new 
form of governance, one responsible to the people’s want of strong and reliable 
economic growth and increased access to prosperity.  
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Chapter 5 
The Cases of Egypt and Tunisia 
 
 Up until this chapter this study has taken a notably broad view of the Middle 
East and North African region in both social and economic terms, treating the area 
as a whole. The present chapter will focus on two particular countries in the region: 
Egypt and Tunisia. Egypt and Tunisia serve as two examples of not only successful 
revolutions, in the sense that in both countries the autocratic rulers were 
overthrown, but also as countries in which economic factors played a key role in the 
uprisings that led to changes in their regimes. In the case of each county, in addition 
to the general economic trends, special attention will be focused on the role of the 
youth, the more highly-educated segments of the population, and women.  
 What these studies will aim to show is that the one of the major and 
motivating factor across many different sections of the Egyptian and Tunisian 
populations was the lack of economic opportunity. It was not, however, economic 
factors by themselves which drove the populations of these states to rise up in 2011. 
A drastic increase in education and the resulting want for opportunity coupled with 
a lack of meaningful prospects for personal economic advancement was a decisive 
factor in driving Tunisians and Egyptians to revolt. Corruption was a daily part of 
life, the ability to find employment was bleak, and citizens felt a general sense of 
hopelessness about their future economic prospects. In a general sense the 
demonstrations emphasized economic grievances, specifically unemployment, 
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inflation, and the increasingly high cost of living.104 This is inversely comparable to 
the states of Saudi Arabia, where an expansion of educational opportunity has been 
met by robust and durable economic opportunity, and India where there is a lack of 
economic and educational opportunity, and in both states there has not been a 
widespread popular revolt, two counter examples which will be explored in the final 
section of this chapter.  
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Case #1- Tunisia- Where it all Began 
           
 As was noted at the beginning of chapter 2, Tunisian citizen Muhammad Al-
Bouazizi in an act of defiant self-immolation began a regional cascade of events now 
being characterized as the Arab Spring. This act was microcosmic, dramatic, 
disturbing, and reflecting of the frustration many average Tunisian citizens were 
feeling. As a recent paper published by the International African institute in 
conjunction with the Royal African Society and World Peace Foundation contended, 
Bouazizi’s “act of self-immolation and subsequent death struck a chord and created 
enormous outrage, leading thousands […] out onto the streets of Sidi Bouzid in 
solidarity […] to protest about unemployment and poor living conditions”.105 
However, even more important than the act itself were the reasons behind why 
Bouazizi did it. 
Life in Tunisia was comfortable and easy for a very select few of the political 
elite, headed by the defiantly corrupt autocrat Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who headed 
the state from 1987, after a bloodless coup d'état, until 2011. Simply put, 
“The Tunisian revolution took the world by surprise. Never before in the 
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history of the modern Arab World had a grassroots revolt toppled an 
entrenched dictator of […] Ben Ali’s caliber and longevity without recourse to 
any established ideology, organized social movement and political party, or 
foreign intervention”.106 
 
So while the uniqueness and unpredictability of this revolution is certainly 
important, what is equally if not more important is understanding what conditions 
and factors led the long subjugated Tunisian citizenry to revolt against a well-
entrenched dictator.  
 As argued in the previous chapters, it was the long-standing economic 
situation within Tunisia which finally pushed the disadvantaged segments of the 
Tunisian population to take on a risky and uncertain uprising against their 
oppressor. Besides the economic factors, a number of other explanations about the 
root causes of the Arab Spring have been offered in the growing scholarly literature. 
Some have gone so far as to label this the “Facebook Revolution”, the “Internet 
Revolution”, or the ‘Twitter Revolution”.107 As it was argued for before, these media 
technologies were mere mobilizing factors for the downtrodden population. 
Certainly they aided in disseminating information and grievances, especially among 
the technologically savvy youth population. However, the same economic problems 
would have existed among the Tunisian citizenry with or without access to the 
communication technologies. Additionally, means of communication between 
citizens had existed long before the uprisings took place, including newspapers, 
telephones, and social gathering spaces such as coffee shops, bars, and restaurants. 
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While indeed the rapidity of social media based communication may have increased 
the pace of the revolution it did not overtly cause it. 
 Furthermore, much of the scholarly literature has also argued for the overt 
mobilizing power of the want for political rights by the Tunisian citizenry. However, 
as a recent article by the Middle East Research and Information Project argues, “most 
Tunisians tolerated the government’s repression. As the press never ceased to 
remind them, a vigorous economy that could generate new jobs depended on 
Tunisia’s ability to attract foreign investment in a competitive regional 
environment”.108 However, as this economic growth slowed and left more and more 
people poor and destitute the acceptability of the Tunisian populace with the empty 
promises of the Ben Ali government waned dramatically. The change Tunisians 
sought was economic in nature and not political.  
 To aid in this assertion it is important to grasp the overall economic trends 
that led to the uprising in Tunisia before undertaking a more nuanced approach to 
the role of the different segments of the population in the uprisings. In addition to 
the general unemployment, GDP per capita, and Gini coefficient statistics that were 
presented earlier, there are a number of other descriptive statistics which further 
capture the direness of the economic situation for the vast majority of Tunisians in 
the years before the revolution. According to Transparency International, under the 
direction of the United Nations, as of 2011 on the eve of the Arab Spring, Tunisia 
ranked 73rd globally in corruption and there had been a dramatic uptick in ‘crony 
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capitalism’ in the years preceding the uprising. Ben Ali caused this in large part with 
his near monopolistic power over the corruption apparatus of the state.109  
Moreover, what Ben Ali and his closest allies clung to was that despite 
perceived shortcomings in the matter in which they ran the state domestically, the 
services provided by the state were still more than adequate and in some cases far 
better than their regional counterparts. This was something that was widely 
accepted by large sections of the Tunisian citizenry for decades.110 However, “the 
provision and quality of public service (health care, social security, education, and 
so on) hitherto a showpiece of the Tunisian state, declined as a consequence of 
unemployment, rising prices, [and] inflation” in the decade prior to the uprisings.111 
The lack of available capital and tax revenue from the lower classes of citizens put 
more and more strain on the central government operated social safety system. 
Additionally, the Ben Ali family and its closest allies rendered the two anti-
corruption bodies of the state, the National Audit Office and Disciplinary Financial 
Court, completely powerless. Bribery and nepotism within the government had 
become commonplace features of doing business, and “public procurement 
contracts were often awarded to government cronies and a few influential clans 
                                                        
109 Transparency International, “Corruption Trends in the Middle East and North Africa,” The United 
Nations & CHR Michelin Institute, accessed February 16, 2015, 
http://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-trends-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-region-
2007-2011/.  
110 Christopher Alexander, “Authoritarianism and Civil Society in Tunisia: Back from the Democratic 
Brink,” Middle East Research Information Project 273(2014), accessed March 27, 2015, 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer205/authoritarianism-civil-society-
tunisia?ip_login_no_cache=62381526659d9ab18c85deffc9635f9b. 
111 Sami Zemni, “From Socio-Economic Protests to National Revolt: The Labor Origins of the Tunisian 
Revolution,” in The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, and Prospects, ed. Nouri 
Gana (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 129.  
 43
around the president [who] owned most of the country’s businesses”.112 Ben Ali, his 
family, and close supporters enriched themselves in the face of grave economic 
problems and a disgruntled citizenry.113 Falling international investment and 
troubling economic indicators did little to change the ways in which the Ben Ali 
family acted. As one United States diplomatic cable stated, regarding a dinner held 
with the family of Ben Ali, “the opulence with which El Materi and Nasrine [his wife] 
live and their behavior make clear why they and other members of Ben Ali’s family 
are disliked and even hated by some Tunisians. The excesses of the Ben Ali family 
are growing”.114 These extravagances, from the perspective of many impoverished 
Tunisians, only added fuel to the already smoldering frustration many had with the 
way in which the government was providing opportunities.  
 It went as far as the Ben Ali family controlling most major industries 
including but not limited to: cement production, media, petroleum procurement and 
refining, insurance, construction, domestic and international shipping, air transport 
including the airports and national flag carrier Tunsiair, numerous luxury car 
dealerships, and telecommunications. At its height Ben Ali and his family controlled 
over a third of national GDP, a truly astounding figure considering that a small 
family controlled such a vast share with a national population of almost eleven 
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million people.115 The rich-poor divide was so powerful that as of 2000, the last year 
this statistic was calculated, the top 10% of the Tunisian population controlled 
31.5% of the GDP while the bottom 10% controlled a derisory 2.3%, and it has been 
suggested across the scholarly literature that this gap continued to widen 
throughout the decade prior to the uprisings.116 This thus left the vast majority of 
Tunisian citizens on the periphery of success, unable to gain a meaningful leg up in 
personal economic growth due to Ben Ali’s overarching control of the national 
economy.  
As a result of the above inequalities, the vast majority of Tunisians, despite 
the façade of social safety provided by Ben Ali’s regime, were unable to increase 
their personal economic standing due to the very configuration of the economy. Ben 
Ali and his closest confidants had organized the state economic structure in such a 
way as to protect their massive wealth at the expense of the citizenry. The 
expanding wealth gap in the decade prior to uprising only exacerbated this situation 
for many Tunisians. Change in the corrupt and self-serving structure of the economy 
was not going to come about out of the benevolence of their leader, it was 
something that would have to be demanded and brought about by themselves.  
Now that a broad overview of the challenging economic situation in Tunisia 
has been fully expounded, the first of these frustrated and subjugated subgroups 
that will be analyzed is the youth population. Generally speaking the GDP growth of 
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Tunisia had been in a steady decline since 2006 and was having a great deal of 
difficulty keeping pace with the large number of educated youths entering the 
working population every year. 117 Additionally, there existed, and continues to 
exist, a notably large youth bulge in Tunisia118, which has made advancing job and 
economic growth to this large segment of the population evermore important to 
maintain a peaceful state.119 From 2002 until 2004 the unemployment rate for those 
with a secondary education in Tunisia stood at 35% and then increased to an 
astounding 38% in 2005. In 2006 this number improved slightly to a still 
astonishing 36% before declining to 40% from 2008-2010, and then declined again 
to 43% in 2011 on the eve of the uprisings.120  
These unemployment numbers are similar to the overall unemployment 
rates for Tunisians with a tertiary (post-secondary) level of education as well. In 
2008, the first year data from the World Bank is available for this subset of the 
population, the rate stood at 26%, in 2009 the rate increased to 28%, in 2010 it 
further increased to 32%, and in 2011 on the eve of the uprising the rate decreased 
slightly to a still terrible 31%.121 If taken as a point of comparison for those with a 
tertiary education as of 2008 the unemployment rate in Europe and Central Asia 
taken as a conglomerate was 20% and among OECD members the rate was 23%.122 
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Thus, when compared to its global peers Tunisia was far behind in creating positive 
levels of available employment to its most highly educated group of citizens. Those 
with the highest prospects and desires for well paying and stable employment were 
among the most unemployed demographic within Tunisia. As Ragui Assaad of the 
Humphrey School of International Affairs argues, “simply by having large numbers 
of people who are very frustrated at their inability to turn their education into 
productive jobs, […] really exacerbated the problems”.123  
Additionally, the Tunisian state under Ben Ali spent a good deal of money on 
education expenditures, averaging 6.2% of GDP or 38th place globally and matching 
the percent of GDP expenditure of the United Kingdom.124 Furthermore, from 1980 
until 2010 Tunisia ranked 19th globally in educational attainment, averaging a 4.07 
year increase over the period.125  However, most youths saw little growth in 
economic prospects from this expenditure. Consequently, although young Tunisians 
saw the expansion of higher education as a “positive development that created 
tremendous opportunities, massive unemployment and underemployment […] 
foreclosed those opportunities”.126 Subsequently, while Tunisian youth were 
receiving good educations across a number of academic disciplines, including many 
in business, law, and engineering, the necessary matching types of employment 
were not available, which led to an angry population of youths. Many trained 
lawyers and engineers had nowhere to practice and utilize their newly minted skills, 
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and were stuck instead working low-paying jobs or not working at all, relying on a 
constantly shrinking state support apparatus.  
The above numbers are even more telling, especially when compared to the 
aggregate number of youth unemployment, no matter the level of education. From 
2003 until 2005 the unemployment rate for all youths stood at 31% then improved 
slightly to a still notably high 28% from 2006 until 2008 and then went up to 31% in 
2009 before decreasing to 28% again in 2010 and then went up astronomically to 
43% in 2011 on the eve of the revolution.127 Overall, Tunisia is the tenth worst state 
in the world for overall youth employment flanked above and below by Croatia and 
Montenegro and is in the same realm as Namibia and South Africa.128 Additionally, 
according to a 2010 study by the United Nations, 39% and 24% Tunisian youth 
were still unemployed 18 months and 3 years after their graduation from primary 
school respectively during the decade which proceeded the uprisings.129  
While there is indeed a slight variance between the years in the total number 
of youth unemployed, what these statistics show, in a general sense, is just how 
extraordinary the unemployment rates were for the not only the region’s youth but 
also for those with high levels of education.130 Additionally, what this trend in a lack 
of employment for not only Tunisia’s educated youth but also the uneducated youth 
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show is that there was a distinct lack of ‘blue-collar’ jobs available to help drive 
economic growth. Thus, each youth’s prospect for personal success and 
advancement was immensely small, no matter their level of education, especially 
when compared to their educated peers globally.   
Education in its social goal is meant to increase the prospects for personal 
economic advancement over the course of one’s working life. By educating the 
Tunisian youth population Ben Ali in many ways set his own regime up for a 
popular revolution. For the same reason uprisings against the central government 
do not occur in the poorest slums of Mumbai or Lagos, where one’s main concern is 
survival, is the reason the educated and unemployed youths of Tunisia revolted 
against Ben Ali. Poverty in and of itself is not a powerful enough driver to revolution 
proven by the vast number of impoverished people that live around the globe, 
numbering about 1.2 billion. Instead it must be coupled with other economic 
grievances and education to truly push a population to revolt. In Tunisia this was 
certainly the case.  
What this highly motivated youth population further demonstrates is the 
complementary power of social media. Globally the youth population has increased 
its use of social communicative technologies greatly over the past decade, especially 
in the realm of online communication. In Tunisia there is little doubt Internet access 
aided in disseminating grievances among the population and was a powerful tool in 
aiding large swaths of the citizenry to know that others shared in their frustrations. 
However, it were these palpable economic frustrations that drove youths to their 
computers in the first place. Unemployment and education pushed young people to 
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communicate digitally and then revolt in the streets. 
When compared to the youth population, the aggregate female population in 
Tunisia faced similarly bleak economic circumstances in the years prior to the 
revolution. The total unemployment rate for Tunisia’s females, no matter their age 
or education level, stood at 18% from 2001-2002, before improving slightly to 17% 
from 2003 to 2005, and then improved slightly again to 15% from 2006 to 2010, 
before declining significantly to 22% in 2011just before the uprisings occurred. 131 & 
132 While indeed these aggregate numbers appear lower than those of the youth 
population, they are still extraordinarily high overall figures, especially when 
Tunisia considered itself under Ben Ali as a progressive state for women’s rights.  
In his often publicized public policies Ben Ali,  
“intuitively understood how to bend the Western-inflicted liberal rights 
lexicon to suit his autocratic ends, […] he trumpeted support for women’s 
rights activities, contrasting his regime’s stable secularity with Islamists, 
whom he portrayed as reactionary to terrorists and stubbornly opposed to 
women’s rights”.133  
 
However, while these general political rights were marginally more secure in 
Tunisia, when compared to its regional and global peers, women’s economic growth 
potential was in general quite limited.  
Furthermore, the revolt from the Tunisian women’s perspective was not 
primarily caused by political concerns, as some scholars have argued. Since the 
1950’s women have held an average of 50% of the seats in parliament and have 
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guaranteed political participation for well over 60 years.134 Simply put, “Tunisian 
women’s trailblazing and advantageous legal status is considered an exception in 
Muslim countries”.135 So while political rights were well established in Tunisian 
society for women, their rights to economic opportunity and growth were decidedly 
lacking, especially shown through the high unemployment rates over the decade 
preceding the revolution. Moreover, according to the International Labor 
Organization, women on average in Tunisia earned a good deal less than their male 
counterparts and unemployment rates remained much higher for women than 
men.136 So while political participation was guaranteed across both genders, 
economic opportunities which were already lacking for male Tunisians were even 
lower for female Tunisians.  
By guaranteeing fundamental political rights while not providing for the 
necessary avenues to economic growth for women, Ben Ali’s government 
exacerbated his own demise in much the same way as his treatment of the youth 
population. Providing for political participation was much easier and palatable to a 
greedy autocrat than relinquishing control of his wealth grip on the upper echelon 
of the economy. Thus, while guaranteeing political participation appears on its 
façade a move toward progressivism, in reality it was, in the same way as increased 
education, a failed stopgap in preventing women from realizing their true potential 
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for personal economic advancement. One the population of Tunisia came to full 
realization of in early 2011. 
Now that not only a general exploration of Tunisia’s economy prior to the 
Arab Spring has been explored, but also a number of sub-sects within the 
population, it has become clear just how dire the economic situation for the majority 
of the state’s eleven million citizens was and how strong a causal factor this was 
when compared to political grievances. Certainly, as has been argued by numerous 
scholars, the use of various media technologies aided in disseminating information 
and grievances that people, especially youths, had. In sum, aside from numerous 
economic challenges which pervaded all aspects of life, what led the Tunisian 
citizens to rise up against their long-entrenched dictator, especially a dictator who 
exerted such long-standing control over the economy for personal gain, was a 
massive increase in the education of Tunisian society and generally widespread 
long-standing political rights coupled with a complete lack of prospects for 
economic advancement.  
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Case #2- Egypt- A Mix of Bad and Worse 
           
 
 From the middle of January 2011 until February, when Hosni Mubarak finally 
relinquished control of the government, “millions of Egyptians demonstrated in the 
streets to demand as many chanted, ‘isqat al-nizam’, ‘the fall of the regime’”.137 The 
citizens of Egypt were, much like their Tunisian counterparts, angry at a 
governmental system broken and irresponsive to the wants and needs. Thousands 
of irritated and irate citizens collected in Tharir Square demanding change in the 
face of an entrenched and powerful autocracy.  
Egypt, which saw the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in February of 2011 after 
29 years in power, shows the importance of the lack of economic opportunity, 
corruption, and cronyism in causing a revolution to occur.138 And again similar to 
the case of Tunisia, numerous scholars have argued for a number of factors in 
causing the uprisings against Mubarak’s regime. Some have even contended that the 
relatively impressive GDP growth figures, when compared to its regional 
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counterparts, and foreign direct investment, which was being aggressively invested 
into the Egyptian economy from numerous states and multi-national corporations, 
as proof that this was a purely political revolution. However, as this chapter will 
attempt to show, “the impressive growth rates masked widening income 
inequalities and fell short of the aspirations of the young and educated generation 
who would take to the streets in 2011”.139  
However, political participation in Egypt had been on a strong path to 
normalization, especially shown in the 2005 election cycle. The “2005 election 
season in Egypt has been characterized as a “new departure” within the Egyptian 
political sphere” and brought 88 members of the long repressed Muslim 
Brotherhood party into the 444 seat lower house.140 Additionally, these 2005 
“parliamentary elections came in the wake of important formal changes to the 
Egyptian Constitution, particularly the decision to allow direct, multi-candidate 
presidential elections as stipulated by the May 2005 amendment to Article 76,” an 
amendment which was supported on its façade by Mubarak.141 Beyond these 
structural changes women, in a similar manner to Tunisian women, had maintained 
an important position in Egyptian politics during the decades prior to the uprisings, 
especially in maintaining support for different political groups and drumming up 
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votes with other women.142 Additionally, when compared to many of its regional 
peer states women in Egypt as well as Tunisia had more normal political lives, 
actively participating in local and state politics. Thus, the political life of many 
Egyptians was following a path to positive change in the years before the uprisings, 
especially when compared to economic advancement over the same period.  
Furthermore, as has been a popular mantra across numerous academic 
communities, many have attributed the uprisings in Egypt to social media and 
increased telecommunication and Internet access. As Richard N. Haass argued for in 
a recent article for Foreign Affairs, specifically regarding the revolution Egypt and 
the region more generally,  
“Indeed social media are a […] factor, but their role has been exaggerated. It 
is hardly the first disruptive technology to come along: the printing press, 
telegraph, telephone, radio, television, and cassettes all posed challenges to 
the existing order of their day. And like these earlier technologies, social 
media are not decisive: they can be repressed by governments as well as 
employed by governments to motivate their supporters”.143  
 
Would, however, the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia have taken on such a 
powerful zeal without these communication technologies? The explosion in 
available rapid communication technologies did indeed aid in the dissemination of 
information within and across states both before and during the revolutions and 
motivated youths could share their frustrations effectively.  
The ability to share grievances and ideals has always been a powerful 
motivating factor for uprisings. Without the more recent advent of social media 
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however, it is highly plausible that motivated citizens in Egypt and Tunisia would 
have still communicated their grievances with the best available means of the day, 
as Richard Haas argues for in the previously paragraph. Thus, it is much clearer that 
social media, while attractive in its explanatory simplicity, played only a 
complementary role, granted one that was far more rapid in its usefulness than the 
newspaper or other more dated communication technologies. In other words, in the 
Egyptian revolution social media acted as a fan which helped the flame of the 
revolution burn hotter and faster, in a much similar way to Tunisia. 
 According to Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren in their book The Battle for the 
Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution, and the Making of a New Era, in a 
striking similarity to Tunisia and “despite living in one of the largest and most 
diversified economies in Africa [and the Middle East], many Egyptians were on low 
incomes” with the overall number increasing from 16% in 2000 to 21% in 2008.144 
Additionally, by 2008 over 2.5 million people were living on less that $1.25 a day, 
which is considered ‘extreme poverty’ by the United Nations and is not suitable to 
maintain a healthy, stable, or comfortable life.145 
 While compared to other states in the Middle East and North Africa the 
amount of available data on poverty in Egypt is more limited, especially when 
compared to Tunisia. There is still, however, a comparative pattern that emerges. 
Looking back to 2000, 19% of the population was living on less than $2 per day and 
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in 2005 this number increased to 20% of the population.146 When this is taken in 
conjunction with Noueihed and Warren’s argument above for the high levels of ‘low 
incomes’ it shows that a vast proportion of the Egyptian population was not reaping 
any benefits from the perceived flourishing and resilient diversity of the Egyptian 
economy. In fact, poverty levels measured on a purely national comparative level to 
required levels of income to maintain a reasonable quality of life were astoundingly 
high.  
In 2000 the poverty headcount rate stood at 16.7%, in 2005 it regressed to 
19.6%, in 2009 it further lapsed to 21.6%, and in 2011 right before the onset of 
revolution it increased further to 25.2%.147 Thus, a pattern of increased poverty 
over the decade prior to the revolution continually made life more difficult for an 
already fragile Egyptian population. Living in poverty has a noted negative effect on 
a population group, and this was true in Tunisia as well as Egypt. Poverty can act as 
a driver of malnutrition, social stigmatization, decline in academic performance, and 
exacerbate a lack of meaningful academic prospects during one’s adolescence and 
young adulthood.  
Additionally, while Egypt did indeed have reasonably high GDP growth this 
money was not finding its way into the hands of most of Egypt’s population, 
demonstrated earlier though the Gini coefficient, which averaged .308 or a high-
medium ranking of inequality. This is further shown when as of 2008 the top 10% of 
Egyptian income earners controlled 26.6% of the GDP while the bottom 10% 
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controlled only 4% of the GDP.148 This is a quite comparable figure to Tunisia’s 
wealth gap demonstrated in the previous section. By exerting control over large 
sectors of the economy both Mubarak and Ben Ali removed the ability for most of 
their populations to improve their prospects for economic growth and stability. 
They were not benevolent dictators working to maintain their power by quelling 
citizen’s economic grievances through increasde access to wealth and economic 
safety, something many oil-producing states, especially Saudi Arabia, chose as a path 
to prevent revolt. To the contrary, they expanded their personal fortunes at the 
expense of most of the citizenry, leading to a poor and destitute population. 
Furthermore, the pattern of economic dejection is shown though the 
unemployment statistics for the population as well. From 2000 until 2010, 
unemployment averaged 10% and never fell bellow 9% and spiked to 12%149 on the 
eve of the revolution in 2011.150 As this follows a similar path as Tunisia, granted 
with marginally lower unemployment rates overall, it is important to fully articulate 
the impact which unemployment can have on a population. As was pointed out 
earlier in chapter 4, unemployment can have a devastating effect on a given state’s 
population leading to large portions of the population to feel hopeless, 
disenfranchised, frustrated, alienated, angry, and can decidedly reduce any feelings 
of nationalism or community with one’s government. This in turn aided in quickly 
mobilizing the Egyptian population to act and rise up against Mubarak. In other 
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words, had the levels of unemployment been much lower, especially among certain 
groups of the population, particularly the educated, the odds of a widespread and 
popular revolution would have been greatly decreased. 
Another important macro factor, which is directly comparable to Tunisia, 
was the high levels of corruption and cronyism within the Egyptian government. 
While Mubarak had attempted, at the behest of the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank, to on its façade privatize more of Egypt’s industry and 
economy in the early 1990s, to avoid a looming credit and debt crisis.151 These 
actions, “were perceived by Egyptians as no more than a ploy by Mubarak and his 
cronies to line their pockets at the expense of the people”.152 Reasoning founded on 
the Egyptian peoples repeated witnessing of the excesses of the Mubarak 
government. A similarly which the Ben Ali regime engaged in as well, spending 
lavishly in the face of impoverished citizens. Additionally, these “structural 
adjustments [of] reduced spending” [adversely affected] factory workers, landless 
peasants, government employees, and those who produce goods for the local 
markets, as opposed to for export [the] most”.153 The system was creating a divided 
two-tier society where “the majority of the Egyptian population was increasingly 
marginalized [and] a small minority prospered like never before”.154   
According to Transparency International in conjunction with the CMI 
Michelin Institute, these perceptions of the population were far more right than 
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wrong as,  
“Experts agree that corruption in Egypt is pervasive and has taken many 
forms, ranging from bribery and facilitation payments in order to get things 
done in different sectors (e.g. police, customs, education), to kickbacks paid 
by companies to public officials in order to receive government tenders, 
trading in influence, embezzlement of public funds, money laundering as well 
as political corruption and widespread nepotism”.155 
Additionally, when a proportional number of small and medium business owners 
were surveyed in 2007, 47% reported paying bribes to government officials to 
receive government contracts or mere government approvals to open and run their 
business, emulating a Mafioso style system of government corruption in which 
doing business was akin to dealing within a system of racketeering, payoffs, and 
corruption.156 
 This long-standing culture of corruption in Egypt goes back decades. 
According to Transparency International in its annual Corruption Perception Index, 
in 2010 Egypt ranked 98th globally with a low rating of 3.1 out of a possible perfect 
10, in 2005 Egypt ranked marginally better at 70th globally with a still low rating of 
3.4, in 2000 Egypt ranked 68th globally, however this figure masks the overall rating 
of 3.1 which is considered quite low.157 These rankings are in the same realm as 
Swaziland, Tonga, Kazakhstan, and Gambia, all states known for extraordinarily high 
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levels of governmental corruption.158 What this historical snapshot of Egypt’s levels 
of corruption shows is that not only was it regionally and globally atrocious but also 
that the levels did not improve in the ten years prior to the Arab Spring.  
Additionally, these high levels of corruption and cronyism are directly 
comparable to the precursor situation in Tunisia where citizens were subject to the 
self-serving whims of Ben Ali. Corruption was removing large amounts of available 
money from the economic systems of Egypt and Tunisia and redirecting it to 
Mubarak and Ben Ali and their closest allies. When many young Egyptian took the 
streets in 2011 they were chanting, directed at the state’s political elites, “They are 
eating pigeon and chicken and we are eating beans all the time”.159 Citizens who 
were subjected to the extraordinarily high levels of corruption in 2000 were dealing 
with the same challenges in 2010, and coupling this with the multitude of other 
statewide economic challenges left a citizenry ripe for revolution.  
Economic challenges such as unemployment are not powerful enough on 
their own, however, to bring about a popular revolution, shown by many states 
globally which struggle with stubbornly high unemployment rates, such as Greece, 
Spain, or much of Central Asia. However, when a small minority of powerful 
autocrats continue to build their personal fortunes at the expense of the vast 
majority of citizens, citizens which are struggling with a variety of challenging 
economic conditions, then the possibility of a revolution becomes much more real. 
As more and more Egyptians and Tunisians were left on the sidelines looking in at a 
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future free from economic concern and larger sections of the population gained 
more education the prevailing system of autocratic governmental control of the 
economy was no longer sufficient. Living on minuscule daily incomes while 
witnessing the extravagance of the Mubarak regime showed Egyptians that the only 
way to guarantee personal economic stability and growth was to change the system 
in which they were living.  
 A final statistic which is important to grasping to full context of the economic 
situation in the years preceding the uprising in Egypt was the very high levels of 
inflation in from 2000 until 2011.160 According to the Federal Reserve of Boston, 
inflation is “sustained rise in the general level of prices” and “high inflation 
adversely impacts economic performance” especially for a given countries mass of 
citizens.161 In Egypt, beginning in 2000 inflation averaged 3%, a relatively ‘healthy’ 
number overall.162 However, over the next decade there would be multiple years of 
dangerously high inflation including 2003 with 7%, 2004 with 12%, 2006 with 7%, 
2007 with 12%, 2008 with 12%, 2009 with 11%, and 2010 with 10%.163 This 
pattern showcases a major increase in inflation in the seven years prior to the Arab 
Spring in Egypt. Citizens who were already dealing with a lack of available 
unemployment and wage parity were now struggling to pay for basic staple goods 
as the prices of these commodities continued to dramatically increase year after 
year. 
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 A population lacking the ability to buy the goods necessary to maintain a 
modest and comfortable life while also contending with the inability to find 
employment to purchase increasingly expensive products logically will challenge 
the system and perpetuate these anxieties. This is especially powerful when coupled 
with the high number of citizens living in poverty in both Tunisia and Egypt. The 
small wages one was earning were losing their relative value more and more each 
year. A hungry stomach coupled with the value of one’s minimal income and savings 
losing its value due to poor governmental economic policies is a powerful 
motivating factor. One the Egyptian and Tunisian populace fully realized prior to the 
start of the uprisings. 
 The economic situation and prospects for youths in Egypt was 
extraordinarily bleak. In a similar circumstance to Tunisia, there existed a notable 
youth bulge in Egypt164, with 50% of the population being under the age of 24 with a 
national median age of 25.1 years old including a 49% dependency rate for those 
under the age of 25.165 In other words, nearly 50% of the young population was 
completely dependent on their parents or the government for life essentials.166 In 
the MENA region and especially in Tunisia and Egypt, as opposed to its global 
counterparts, this youth bulge created a highly dangerous situation for Mubarak and 
Ben Ali. As Ragui Assaad contends, 
“In East Asia and Southeast Asia with their open economies and good 
education systems, they’ve been able to use the youth bulge to their 
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advantage. In the Middle East, unfortunately, it’s turning out to be a challenge 
because of the government’s inability to put together economic policies that 
make use of these human resources”.167  
 
 Removing the possibility for youths to gain economic independence 
increases the feeling of dejection and anger with the system perpetuating this 
challenge. The upper echelon in Egypt, similarly to Tunisia, maintained their corrupt 
control over many sections of the economy. This while Egyptian youths struggled to 
find employment basic enough to support themselves financially. Increased 
educational opportunity drove a general understanding of proper economic order 
and rights and amplified the youth understanding of how a progressive and modern 
economy should provide for its citizens.  
Beginning in 2000 the total youth unemployment rate stood at 26% and then 
regressed to an average of 29% from 2001 until 2004 before increasing again to 
34% in 2005.168 Then from 2006 until 2010 the youth unemployment rate averaged 
28.5% before increasing dramatically to 36% in 2011 on the eve of the 
revolution.169 Overall, Egypt ranked as the 41st worst state in the world for youth 
employment out of a possible 147 states, ranking in the same realm as Ethiopia and 
Dominica.170  These numbers are even more telling when youth women and youth 
male unemployment figures are compared. Beginning in 2000, the unemployment 
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rate for male youths stood at 17% and for females was an astonishing 46%.171 From 
2001 until 2005 the average unemployment for male youths was 21.6% and for 
youth females was an astounding 50.1%.172  
From 2006 until 2009 there was little improvement, with youth male 
unemployment averaging 17.25% and females averaging 53%. Finally in 2011 on 
the eve of the revolution the rate for youth males stood at 24% and for females a 
remarkably telling 65%173.174 What these statistics show is not only that 
unemployment for Egypt’s youths was high but also that it had been that way for the 
more than decade preceding the revolution. As Dina Shehata in an article for Foreign 
Affairs argued, in the years prior to the uprising “labor and youth unrest grew” 
exponentially.175 Thus, when these rates of unemployment are taken in conjunction 
with the high levels of youth education in Egypt, as will be shown next, a truly telling 
picture of economic dejection comes to light.  
While indeed the overall unemployment rates described in the previous few 
paragraphs is a telling statistic, what can be argued as even more important were 
the relatively high levels of higher education among Egyptian youths and the 
corresponding unemployment rates. According to the World Bank, “during the last 
two decades, the evolution of educational attainment in Egypt has been one of 
                                                        
171 The World Bank, “WorldDataBank: World Development Indicators: Egypt,” last updated 2015, 
accessed February 21, 2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#. 
172 The World Bank, “WorldDataBank: World Development Indicators: Egypt,” last updated 2015, 
accessed February 21, 2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#. 
173 These Data can be further explored in Appendix 5.10.  
174 The World Bank, “WorldDataBank: World Development Indicators: Egypt,” last updated 2015, 
accessed February 21, 2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#. 
175 Dina Shehata, “The Fall of the Pharaoh: How Hosni Mubarak’s Reign Came to an End,” 142. 
 65
democratization of access, particularly at the basic and secondary levels”.176 There 
had been exponential gains in the overall levels of education among the most recent 
generation of Egyptians, especially when compared to the parents and 
grandparents.  
Additionally and similarly to Tunisia, Egypt had been a global leader in 
increases in school attainment from 1980-2010 ranking 14th globally with an 
average increase of 4.43 years over that period.177 However, with these gains in 
education came increased want for access to meaningful employment and personal 
economic growth and a new understanding of one’s place in society. As Peter 
Tikusis and Anton Minkov argue in their article Political and Socioeconomic Origins 
of the Arab Uprisings, In Egypt and Tunisia and the MENA region more generally, 
“the expansion of education in the last two-decades has not been matched by 
corresponding improvements in the skilled-labor market”.178 This was further 
compounded by the lack of employment opportunities in the informal sector as 
massive reductions in Egypt’s and Tunisia’s social safety programs, including the 
National Employment Fund in Tunisia, made finding even low paying employment a 
major challenge.179 
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To capture this understanding of one’s understanding of their position in 
society the Arab Youth Survey published by ASDA’a and Burson-Marsteller provides 
an important snapshot of opinions based on large-scale surveys. According to the 
Arab Youth Survey, young people in the entire Arab world were negatively affected 
by the global financial crisis of 2008, parts of which do not remain fully recovered to 
this very day.180 Furthermore, youth in North Africa, specifically Egypt, felt the 
affects of the downturn the hardest.181 Among the concerns for Arab Youths, 
especially Egyptian and Tunisian youths, the top three in 2009-2010 were the rising 
cost of living, shortage of affordable housing, and unemployment, all decidedly 
economic concerns.182 There was a palpable fear of economic stagnation and of 
slipping into poverty, and the policies of these various governments only 
perpetuated these anxieties. 
So where did this new understanding of the economic rights of citizenship 
begin? Arguably, the vast increase in available education aided in creating a young 
citizenry with a better understanding of the world around them and the true 
meaning of economic success. Educated Egyptians and Tunisians looking to wealthy 
oil-producing states, such as Saudi Arabia and The United Arab Emirates, and 
European neighbors across the Mediterranean brought a new found understanding 
of the proper organization of an economy.  
Attendance rates for education, similarly to Tunisia, had greatly expanded in 
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the twenty years prior to the uprisings. Beginning with primary school attendance 
rates from 2008-2011, the net attendance ratio for males averaged 88.6% and 
87.2% for females. For secondary school participation over the same period the net 
attendance ratio was 70.5% for males and 69.5% for females.183 Additionally, the 
literacy rate for male youths prior to the Arab Spring stood at 92.4% and was 86.1% 
for females.184 Furthermore, “college completion rates among the same groups have 
more than doubled from 7% in 1988 to 17% in 2006”185 &186  
Overall, Egypt had also successfully managed to close the gender gap at the 
secondary and higher education levels across the majority of the population. 187 This 
is not to say, however, that Egypt stood as bastion of education and there still 
existed large rural/urban divides in not only the quality of education available but 
also the overall levels of education attainment. As the World Bank argued, “through 
no fault of their own, a large number of Egyptians from disadvantaged backgrounds 
do not have the resources they need to get a good education and a fair shot at 
success in life,” an ideal further proven by the overall high levels of youth 
unemployment expounded earlier.188  
Beginning in 2008, the first time the World Bank studied and published 
unemployment statistics for those with tertiary (post-secondary) education, the 
                                                        
183 The United Nations, “Statistics, Egypt,” UNICEF, accessed February 28, 2015, 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/egypt_statistics.html.  
184 The United Nations, “Statistics, Egypt,” UNICEF, accessed February 28, 2015, 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/egypt_statistics.html. 
185 These Data can be further explored in Appendix 5.11. 
186 Lire Ersado, “Education in Egypt: inequality of opportunity across three generations,” The World 
Bank. 
187 Lire Ersado, “Education in Egypt: inequality of opportunity across three generations,” The World 
Bank.  
188 Lire Ersado, “Education in Egypt: inequality of opportunity across three generations,” The World 
Bank. 
 68
total rate was 32%, with a subgroup rate of 32% for women and 31% for men.189 In 
2009, the total rate increased to 36%, with 34% for women and 38% for men.190 In 
2010 the rate further increased to 40% total, with 42% for women and 37% for 
men.191 Finally, on in 2011 on the eve of the uprisings, the rate decreased slightly to 
a still deplorable 32%, with 41% for females and 25% for males192.193 Thus, those 
with the highest levels of education were suffering from some of the highest 
unemployment rates compared to other subsets of the Egyptian population. The 
group most primed to be successful financially were suffering the most.  
Additionally, in Egypt “the education system [was] not preparing young 
people with the skills for the modern workplace and career guidance in general, is 
not available [which has] create[d] frustration among youth about their future and 
their role in society as productive individuals”.194  As Francis Bacon asserted, 
“knowledge is power” and large educated sections of the population were becoming 
aware of the deplorableness of their economic situation. Thus in the simplest of 
terms, what this exploration of educated unemployment rates across genders 
proves is that, much like their regional counterparts in Tunisia, Egyptians had little 
to be enthusiastic about with regards to their government’s prevailing economic 
policies. The rich were getting richer at the expense of large sections of the 
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population and the poor were getting educated and poorer, a pattern certainly 
predisposed to starting a revolution.  
Education is a powerful societal tool. It can inspire vast increases in 
technology, social theories, economic durability, and equality. However, in Egypt 
and Tunisia education was not used in this manner effectively. Autocratic control 
over the economy and a lack of opportunity gave youths a false sense of hope going 
forward for economic improvement. What in its purest form should be a tool of 
opportunity and personal growth was instead a part of the changing societal system 
which brought down the regimes of both Mubarak and Ben Ali. Generally speaking, 
as contended by Tikuisis and Minkov, “the effects of higher education, although by 
itself not a direct cause for political violence, can be compounded by the large 
number of youths and a weak job market,” and this was especially true in Egypt and 
Tunisia.195 
Furthermore, taken as a whole the overall unemployment rate for Egyptian 
females shows a longstanding level of economic dejection with little improvement. 
According to a study by The Economist in the immediacy after the revolution, “In 
Egypt, the Arab world's powerhouse, women may work outside the home, go to 
school and university, and are free to vote and run in all elections. But in education 
and the labor market, women still greatly lag behind”.196 This social structure was 
similar to Tunisia prior to the Arab Spring as well. Thus, while both states were 
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progressive in the political polices, in reality this did little to increase the real 
quality of life of most Egyptian and Tunisian women. Political rights did not beget 
meaningful personal economic success, something which is necessary to maintain a 
peaceful and durable order in society. 
Starting in 1998 and taken in two year intervals the unemployment rates 
were: 20%, 23%, 24%, 24%, 24%, 19%, 23%, and finally in 2011 stood at 23%197.198 
This is especially interesting when coupled with the available education statistics 
for the decade preceding the Arab Spring. Women’s literacy increased from 68% in 
2000 to 77% in 2009 and net enrolment of girls in primary education as a 
percentage of the total population of possible female students rose from 86.4% in 
2000 to 93.8% in 2009.199 
What this pattern fully demonstrates is that women saw little to no 
improvements in their economic quality of life over this period, this while the levels 
of political participation and education continued to increase. As Nadine Sika in her 
article An Egyptian Spring for Women argued, “in the past two decades two 
contradicting trends occurred: higher education and unemployment. Women 
attained higher levels of education, and with this came higher expectations for 
better standards of living”.200 Thus, as women were becoming more socially 
conscious to the levels of economic dejection they were subjected to, their want for 
change in the face of these highly undesirable economic circumstances was purely 
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logical and based in a new found want for personal economic advancement. 
This follows the same pattern as the youth populations in both Tunisia and 
Egypt prior to the onset of the uprisings. Increased access to social and economic 
information through education was remapping the way many citizens viewed their 
place in society. Through the lens of education both youths and women were 
discovering why autocratic control was no longer in their best interest economically 
going forward. To change their personal situations, more would have to be done by 
the central government than guaranteeing political rights or providing access to 
increased education. 
Furthermore, these unemployment statistics hide an even deeper level of 
economic disadvantage for women in Egypt, as a significant percentage of women 
who were ‘employed’ prior to the Arab Spring did so in jobs characterized as ‘unpaid 
family work’. According to a study by the American University in Cairo, “A large 
proportion of women, approximately 34% in 2007 of the total female labor force, 
[were] engaged in unpaid family work. This percentage is much higher than the 
corresponding percentage of male workers in unpaid family work (8.1%)”.201 
Additionally, it was also exceedingly rare in Egypt for women to be employers of 
others, with only 3.12% of the total female work force acting as employers as of 
2010.202 Thus, even when women did find paying work it was rarely a well 
compensating or high-level profession and left little room for real social mobility or 
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increased levels of income. The glass ceiling with which Egyptian women were 
forced to operate within was nearly unbreakable.  
This portrait of economic dejection for the vast majority of Egyptian women 
is revealing and significant when compared to their political rights. It has been a 
popular position from many scholars and media outlets to assert the Egyptian 
uprisings occurred due to primarily political factors. However, this is negated by the 
policies of the Mubarak administration for inclusive political participation for 
women, a notable similarity to the policies of Ben Ali’s government. In the year 2000 
the Mubarak administration established the National Council for Women, which 
“reaffirmed the regime’s support for women’s development in the Egyptian public 
sphere” and in 2010 prior to the start of the uprisings women were granted a 
minimum quota in parliament.203 While arguably the level of political participation, 
especially when compared to western-liberal states, was low it was still markedly 
higher than the levels of economic empowerment available and much higher when 
compared to the vast majority of Arab states.  
However, as the uprisings showed, guaranteed political rights were not 
enough to quell the grievances many citizens, especially women, had with both 
Mubarak and Ben Ali’s governments. Voting and participating politically can be a 
powerful motivating factor for feeling included in one’s government. However, the 
corrupt and crony based economic polices in both Tunisia and Egypt negated this 
feeling of meaningful inclusion. The inability to find stable well-paying jobs, the 
increased costs associated with rampant inflation, and the inequality of the 
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economic system perpetuated a feeling of exclusion for many citizens.   
Furthermore, the continued challenge with which the Egyptian economy and 
political system have had since the fall of Mubarak illuminates the importance of 
economic factors in starting the revolution. If the women, youth, or citizens in 
general had simply wanted a political transformation of their society away from 
autocracy to democracy or some other form of governance then the ousting of 
Mubarak would have spelled the end of protests. However, this has not been the 
case. Economic challenges have continued to plague the Egyptian state since 2011 
and the population remains in a state of economic flux as the government attempts 
to sort out the myriad of economic problems left by Mubarak corrupt 
government.204  
As the above number of economic statistics are taken as a whole it becomes 
clear just how desperate and deplorable the economic situation in Egypt was prior 
to the onset of the Arab Spring. Youths, the educated, women, and the population as 
whole was subject to a corrupt economy growing at far too slow a rate to keep up 
with population growth and the influx of more and more well educated citizens. The 
rich were getting richer and the poor getting poorer, the haves gaining more at the 
expense of the have-nots. The system was one of political and educational rights 
with no prospects of durable personal economic security. One could vote and read 
but could not count on being able to buy affordable staple goods or gain meaningful 
employment. 
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Additionally, as this second case study illustrates there existed a great many 
similarities between Egypt and Tunisia in the decades preceding the uprisings. It 
was these highly comparable antecedent economic situations which had a drastic 
effect on the populations of both Tunisia and Egypt, and it was these numerous 
economic grievances which finally pushed the populations of both states into full-
scale revolution. Egyptians and Tunisians wanted a fair and reasonable opportunity 
for success and their current leaders, Mubarak and Ben Ali, and their cronies denied 
the vast majority, except for a select group of powerful confidants, this humanistic 
right. 
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Counter Example: Saudi Arabia 
The assertions of the Egyptian and Tunisian cases, that education coupled 
with unemployment and a myriad of other negative economic circumstances will 
lead a population to revolt against its government, cannot stand on their own. To 
better illustrate the plausibility of this argument the counter example of Saudi 
Arabia will be explored as an instance where there are high levels of education, at 
least for men, and relatively high levels of economic opportunity as well as a strong 
social safety net. In Saudi Arabia the current form of government has remained 
durable and there has not been a popular revolt by angry and dejected groups of the 
population.  
One of the more persuasive of the alternative explanations for the causation 
of the 2011 uprisings across the Arab works was the powerful motivating factor of a 
lack of political opportunity. That it was a revolution for freedom, political rights, 
and even democracy. However, this is an oversimplification and overgeneralization 
when applied to the population in general. In fact, the very countries where the 
revolutions and protests took place demonstrate their decided economic basis. It 
was certainly not a coincidence “that most oil-rich countries in the Arab world 
experienced neither bread protests in 2008 nor [economic] inspired uprisings in 
2011” something which was further perpetuated by the financial clout of the Gulf 
monarchies, specifically Saudi Arabia.205  
Compared to its regional counterparts Saudi Arabia has a far more resilient 
economy and provides better general opportunities to its citizenry, at least 
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economically speaking. While the hyper-conservatism of the Saudi Arabian state is 
certainly an interesting diversion from the more progressive states of Tunisia and 
Egypt, what this helps to exemplify is that the form of governance is less important 
to maintaining a durable and relatively peaceful state than is providing economic 
opportunities. Saudi Arabia’s GDP per capita was notably higher than either Tunisia 
or Egypt averaging well over $40,000 during the decade preceding the Arab 
Spring.206 Additionally GDP growth has remained robust throughout the same 
period, averaging 6.9% from 2003 until 2011.207 
Furthermore, the overall unemployment figures for Saudi Arabia were 
notably lower during the ten years prior to the regional uprisings when compared 
to Egypt and Tunisia. Beginning in 2000 the unemployment rate, as a percentage of 
the total labor force, stood at 4% and since then averaged 5.5% from 2001 until 
2015.208&209 In having a well employed population with relatively well-paying jobs 
the majority of the Saudi Arabian populace did not feel the same levels of 
disenfranchisement and frustration that their Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts 
faced. The polices of the Saudi government reinforced a general feeling of 
benevolence from King Abdullah, something greatly lacking from Mubarak and Ben-
Ali, especially in his educational reforms and cash distributions.  
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The robust program of education reform brought about by King Abdullah, in 
response to the previously weak national education system, further compounds 
these strong economic statistics. King Abdullah, “made education reform and 
expansion the hallmark of his reign [and] Saudi Arabia is in the midst of a massive, 
ambitious, nationwide program to build more schools and universities, get more 
students to them, [and] make the curriculum relevant to the job market.”210 
Realizing that maintaining a regional position of economic output required a more 
educated population the Saudi leadership acted strongly. However, the main point 
of divergence from Egypt and Tunisia was the Saudi Arabian economy was large and 
resilient enough to absorb new classes of educated citizens.  
The leadership of Saudi Arabia, unlike its Egyptian and Tunisian 
counterparts, fully realized that an aggressive expansion of education must be 
coupled with durable economic growth to maintain a peaceful populace. While the 
expansion of education in Saudi Arabia is a more recent phenomenon, the level of 
growth has been notable. The entire state only had 100 public high schools and 500 
teachers in 1970, by 2005 there were 4,200 high schools and 79,800 teachers.211 
Additionally, when compared to its global counterparts Saudi Arabia spends a great 
deal more money, as a percentage of GDP, on education, outpacing Germany and the 
United States and spending three times more than Singapore.212 
Additionally, as told by Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, “as Egyptians fought 
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each other in bread queues and soldiers were drafted in to bake loaves, energy-rich 
Gulf states like the UAE and Saudi Arabia were seeking to buy up millions of 
hectares of farmland” to diversify their economics for the benefit of their respective 
citizens and quell the possibility of economic revolt.213 These oil rich states, 
especially Saudi Arabia, realized that an economically stable and growing society is 
one that is far less likely to revolt against the state’s leadership. A notion further 
exemplified by the February 2011 announcement by the late King Abdullah, that he 
would spend $35 billion in payments to the country’s citizens as a means to “shoring 
up popular support among the 18 million Saudis and fending off unrest”.214  Thus, 
even those states with relatively resilient and powerful resource based economies, 
especially Saudi Arabia, were still cognizant of the power a population with little 
personal economic growth can wield in a revolutionary scenario and sought to quell 
this angst with further investment in their own population’s wellbeing, benevolence 
and foresight decidedly lacking from the regimes of Ben Ali and Mubarak.  
What the example of Saudi Arabia has aimed to show is that education 
coupled with a lack of matching economic opportunity can drive a population to 
revolt. If both education and economic opportunity remain high, as is the case with 
Saudi Arabia. In other words, a well-educated population enjoying relatively stable 
economic advancement, as in Saudi Arabia, has far less reason to want to change the 
system they are living in, no matter the political order of the state. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
 In the words of Vladimir Lenin on the eve of the Bolshevik revolution, “a 
revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation; furthermore, not every 
revolutionary situation leads to revolution” and there is little doubt the economic 
situation throughout the Middle East and North African region created a situation 
primed for revolution. As was shown in chapters 3 and 4, there was and remains a 
great deal of oppressive economic conditions throughout the Middle East and North 
African region. When compared to its global regional peers, including the 
developing states in Europe as well as the developing states of Southeast Asia, the 
MENA region has the highest composite unemployment rates and showed little 
improvement in the decade preceding the Arab Spring.215  
In general, “Unemployment rates in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Tunisia and Yemen (the MENA 7) have remained stubbornly high, particularly 
among youth”.216 The entire region was bordering on depressive levels of 
unemployment and the majority of citizens were stuck in a positive feedback loop of 
a lack of employment opportunity. In fact, the unemployment rates for many of the 
MENA state’s citizens were far greater than even the rates during the Great 
Depression in the United States during the 1930s, where the unemployment rate 
                                                        
215 These data can be fully explored in Appendix 2 
216 Lili Mottaghi, “The Problem of Unemployment in the Middle East and North Africa Explained in 
Three Charts,” The World Bank, accessed March 9, 2015, 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/problem-unemployment-middle-east-and-north-africa-
explained-three-charts 
 80
peaked at around 20%.217 
 Additionally, while the general economic factors of inflation, composite 
unemployment, poverty, GDP per capita, GDP growth, the Gini coefficient, and 
economic freedom were all restricted, there were numerous segments of the 
populations, especially in Egypt and Tunisia, which were especially limited in their 
prospects for meaningful economic growth. The educated, youths, and women were 
three of the most economically constrained groups in the region. Unemployment for 
these groups remained exceptionally and stubbornly high, as did their prospects for 
economic independence and the ability for one to earn a reasonable living wage. The 
structure of the state, one built on corruption and cronyism, greatly limited the 
ability of these population subsections to attain personal economic fulfillment.  
 Furthermore, youths throughout the region were enjoying the ability to 
attain high levels of education based on increases in government spending on 
education, especially in Tunisia and Egypt. However, this was in no way leading to 
an increase in income or employment. Thus, levels of frustration with their 
governments increased greatly over the ten years prior to the onset of the Arab 
Spring. In the words of Nelson Mandela, “education is the most powerful weapon 
which you can use to change the world,” and nowhere was this more adeptly 
exemplified than in Egypt and Tunisia. To further this assertion, the Arab Youth 
Survey has illuminated these concerns both before and after the Arab Spring. In the 
years prior to the Arab Spring the survey consistently identified economic factors as 
the preeminent concerns of the region’s youths, with rising costs of living, 
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unemployment, and a fear of reaching an economic tipping point of no return among 
the most consistently reported anxieties.218 Additionally, a distinct lack of affordable 
housing and reasonably priced food were also often-reported concerns among the 
region’s youth as well.219 
These trends have continued since the end of Arab Spring among the region’s 
youth as well. Compared to concerns regarding the economy, general welfare, and 
prosperity many other concerns received far less attention and worry by youths in 
the Middle East and North Africa in the post-Arab Spring surveys. Additionally, the 
rise of Islamist movements, transportation, and road safety ranked well bellow 
economic concerns in both the 2012 and 2013 Arab Youth Surveys, which confirms 
that the reasons for which the Arab Spring revolutions were undertaken have not 
yet been resolved.220 Thus, as economic concerns were identified both prior to and 
after the Arab Spring as the main anxieties of the region’s youth it can asserted that 
economics was a powerful driving factor for revolt. In other words, the concerns 
voiced over the period were not simply topic de jour for the region’s youths, they 
were real life concerns that pervaded all aspects of their lives. 
Additionally, an interesting pattern of positive emulation was identified well 
before the Arab Spring among the region’s youth and continued from 2012 to 2013. 
Many of the MENA’s youths did not feel as though their current governments were 
providing them with the quality of life they wanted, and instead many turned to 
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other states as a source of inspiration for what a proper example of economic 
fulfillment and growth could be. Especially prevalent in the surveys were the United 
Arab Emirates and France, 30% and 17% respectively, which ranked highest in 
answering, “which country in the world would you most like your country to be like” 
both before and after the Arab Spring.221 This demonstrates a want for many of the 
region’s youths to attain economic independence and success. France and the United 
Arab Emirates both have stable and growing economies, provide a great deal of 
economic opportunity to their respective youth populations, and rank highly in 
levels of economic freedom, both ranking in the top third of all states according to 
the Index of Economic Freedom.222  
The fact that the revolution and political strife continues in many states 
proves the revolution was not simply a political one with political qualms, but was 
based on economic grievances that continue, especially in Egypt and Tunisia and 
even Libya, to this very day. In other words, if this had been a purely political 
revolution in nature then a simple transition away from autocracy and to democracy 
would have satisfied the populations. However, as the past more than three years 
has demonstrated that is not the case, Egypt remains in a state a decided flux, 
Tunisia is only recently settled into a constitutional form of governance, and Libya 
remains a lawless failed state.  
According to the African Economic Outlook Report published in 2014 jointly 
by the African Development Bank Group, the OECD Development Center, and the 
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United Nations economic concerns going forward will continue to place the greatest 
strain on the new systems of government in place thorough North Africa. The report 
identified that, “one of the principal causes for concern [going forward] in North 
Africa is unemployment, especially among the young, and particular young 
graduates and women.”223 Additionally inflationary pressures in North Africa 
subsided in states where toppling of regimes did not occur. However, in Tunisia and 
Egypt inflation remains high especially in the face of rising government debt 
obligations, which have been used to try and restart their stagnant economies.224  
Moreover, to begin with Egypt, according to a Central Intelligence Agency 
report published in 2015, since the fall of Hosni Mubarak in 2011 the various 
leaders of Egypt’s often-changing government, 
“backtracked on [World Bank recommended] economic reforms, drastically 
increasing social spending to address public dissatisfaction, but political 
uncertainty at the same time caused economic growth to slow significantly, 
reducing the government's revenues. Tourism, manufacturing, and 
construction were among the hardest hit sectors of the Egyptian economy, 
pushing up unemployment levels, and economic growth remains slow”.225 
 
Thus, while the government has attempted to address the rightly perceived reasons 
for why the revolution occurred, it has been tremendously challenging to 
successfully do so. Investment remains weak and unemployment among various 
demographic groups remains dangerously high, as does inflation, currently standing 
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at 10.2% with minimal GDP growth of 3.3%. 226  
 Additionally, there were over twenty days of notable protests in 2014, 
highlighting the continued dissatisfaction of the Egyptian populace with its 
government and the want for more than mere political transformation. While there 
was a great deal of euphoria and optimism after the ousting of Mubarak, this 
hopefulness has turned into a continued general feeling of dejection and dismay at 
the lack of increased economic opportunity in the past more than three years. 
Certainly remaking an economy as destitute as Egypt’s was at the time of the fall of 
Mubarak is no simple or easy task and requires a great deal of capital expenditure 
from the government as well as foreign sources. However, the continued calls for 
change in economic policy and the want for personal economic opportunity by 
Egyptian citizens, especially the youth and female population, will continue to 
plague the state until a meaningful solution for economic stability is created. In 
other words, no Egyptian government is truly safe from the Egyptian citizenry until 
the populace has jobs, cheaper food, and currency stability.  
 Conversely, Tunisia has been a relatively more successful case of democratic 
transition than has Egypt, especially recently in 2014. The government moved from 
the corrupt autocracy of Ben Ali relatively smoothly to a new constitution, which 
was formally ratified in January 2014.  Additionally, once the post-revolutionary 
dust settled during 2012 and 2013 the economy has begun to recover strongly 
under new leadership and the government has explicitly stated it will focus on, 
“bringing down high unemployment, and reducing economic disparities between 
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the more developed coastal region and the impoverished interior”.227 The World 
Bank, based on its understanding of new Tunisian stability, has pledged numerous 
Development Policy Loans totally $1.2 billion as well as $1 billion in technical 
assistance operations loans.228 This fully demonstrates the new found comfort the 
global investment system has with the Tunisian government and will continue to aid 
in the states continued transition to a peaceful economically stable state, one where 
the Tunisian citizens can enjoy the rights of personal economic fulfillment.  
 The present study points to a number of directions for further research. The 
assertion that the Arab Spring was based on widespread economic grievances is a 
notion that can certainly be challenged by those who believe in its more political or 
communication based nature. However, the correlative strength of economic 
challenges, high levels of education, and corrupt governments must not be 
overlooked. Finally, the hypothesis that deplorable economic conditions can and will 
inevitably lead to a popular uprising can be used to try and predict future 
revolutions. 
 In sum, it was the aim of this study to show that a population long suffering 
economic dejection under a corrupt autocratic system will eventually revolt against 
their government. In the case of the Arab Spring, especially Egypt and Tunisia, this 
was certainly the case. Populations as a whole and certain segments more 
specifically were stuck with few prospects for growth and success, this while the 
                                                        
227 The World Fact Book, “Africa: Tunisia,” The Central Intelligence Agency, last updated 2015, 
accessed March 10, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ts.html.  
228 The World Bank, “A Spotlight on the World Bank in Tunisia,” December 11, 2014, accessed March 
10, 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/brief/a-spotlight-on-the-world-bank-
group-in-tunisia.  
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average citizen witnessed the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Entire estates 
were built on cronyism and corruption and something as simple as starting a small 
business took on a mafia style system of payoffs and racketeering. In the words of 
Victor Hugo, “All the forces in the world are not so powerful as an idea whose time 
has come” and in the case of the Middle East and North Africa the time for economic 
change in the face of entrenched autocracy had come.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 2.1-Levels of Freedom in the Middle East and North Africa 
229 
Yellow- Partly Free; Purple- Not Free 
 
Figure 2.2- Levels of Economic Freedom 
230 
                                                        
229 Freedom House, “Middle East and North Africa,” last updated 2015, accessed February 15, 2015, 
https://freedomhouse.org/regions/middle-east-and-north-africa#.VOIRGzpSxlI.  
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Figure 2.3- Results of the Arab Spring Across the MENA Region 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1- Poverty Headcounts for Various MENA States 
231 
                                                                                                                                                                     
230 The Heritage Foundation, “The Middle East and North Africa,” The Wall Street Journal, accessed February 15, 
2015, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/01/middle-east-north-africa-overall-level-of-
economic-freedom-decreases.  
231 The World Bank, “Poverty and Equity Regional Database: The Middle East and North Africa,” last updated 
2015, accessed February 7, 2015, http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/MNA. 
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Figure 4.2- Historical Regional GDP Per Capita Data (In US Dollars)  
 
 Egypt Tunisia Algeria Yemen Iraq Jordan Morocco Libya Syria 
1999 $1,393 $2,426 $1,522 $448 N/A $1,740 $1,386 $5,985 $992 
2001 $1,452 $2,281 $1,702 $546 N/A $1,824 $1,285 $5,404 $1,263 
2005 $1,249 $3,219 $3,038 $831 $1,824 $2,326 $1,948 $7,864 $1,588 
2007 $1,757 $3,806 $3,845 $1,210 $3,091 $3,022 $2,416 $12,418 $2,065 
2009 $2,467 $4,162 $3,771 $1,252 $3,701 $4,026 $2,861 $10,455 N/A 
2011 $2,972 $4,305 $5,271 $1,253 $5,848 $4,666 $3,044 $5,685 N/A 
2013 $3,314 $4,316 $5,360 $1,473 $6,862 $5,214 $3,092 $11,964 N/A 
232 
 
Figure 4.3- Historical Regional Unemployment Rates as a Percentage of Working 
Population 
 
 Egypt Tunisia Algeria Yemen Iraq Jordan Morocco Libya Syria 
2001 9.4% 15.1% 27.3% 14.0% 18.4% 15.8% 12.5% 20.0% 11.6% 
2003 10.4% 14.5% 23.7% 14.3% 29.9% 15.4% 11.9% 20.0% 10.3% 
2005 11.2% 14.2% 15.3% 16.1% 18.0% 14.9% 11.0% 19.8% 9.2% 
2007 8.9% 12.4% 13.8% 15.3% 16.9% 13.1% 9.8% 19.4% 8.4% 
2009 9.4% 13.3% 10.2% 14.6% 15.2% 12.9% 9.1% 18.9% 8.1% 
2011 12.0% 18.3% 10% 17.7% 15.2% 12.9% 8.9% 18.2% 11.5% 
2013 12.7% 13.3% 9.8% 17.4% 16.0% 12.6% 9.2% 19.6% 10.8% 
MENA Region Total Unemployment as of 2013- 12.7%233 
                                                        
232 The World Bank, “GDP Per Capita: Current US$,” last updated 2015, accessed February 8, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.  
233 The World Bank, “Data: Unemployment Totals: % of total labor force (modeled ILO estimate),” last updated 
2015, accessed February 7, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?page=1. 
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Figure 5.1- Youth Employment in the Middle East and North Africa 
234 
 
 
Figure 5.2- Tunisian Population Pyramid Showcasing the Notable Youth Bubble 
 
235 
                                                        
234 The United Nations, “Youth Population and Unemployment in the Middle East and North Africa,” accessed 
February 15, 2015, http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/egm-adolescents/roudi.pdf. 
235 The CIA World Factbook, “Africa: Tunisia,” accessed February 15, 2015, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html. 
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Figure 5.3- Youth Labor Force Participation the Middle East and North Africa 
236 
 
 
Figure 5.4- Tunisia’s GDP growth rate compared to the Middle East and North 
African Region 
 
237 
 
                                                        
236 The United Nations, “Youth Population and Unemployment in the Middle East and North Africa,” accessed 
February 15, 2015, http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/egm-adolescents/roudi.pdf. 
237 The World Bank, “Tunisia,” last updated 2015, accessed February 15, 2015, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia. 
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Figure 5.5- Youth Unemployment Rates in Tunisia 
 
238 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6- Comparative Chart of Total Unemployment, Male Unemployment, and 
Female Unemployment in Tunisia from 2001-2014 
239 
                                                        
238 The World Bank, “World Data Bank: World Development Indicators,” last updated 2015, accessed February 
15, 2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#. 
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5.7- Historical Egyptian Unemployment for the Entire Population  
240 
 
5.8- Historical Inflation for Egypt from 2000-2011 
241 
                                                                                                                                                                     
239 The World Bank, “World Data Bank: World Development Indicators,” last updated 2015, accessed February 
15, 2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#. 
240 The World Bank, “WorldDataBank: World Development Indicators: Egypt,” last updated 2015, accessed 
February 21, 2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#. 
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5.9- Population Pyramid for Egypt Showcasing Notable Youth Bulge 
 
242 
 
5.10- Comparative Chart of Egypt’s Youth Unemployment- Total, Male, and Female 
243 
                                                                                                                                                                     
241 The World Bank, “WorldDataBank: World Development Indicators: Egypt,” last updated 2015, accessed 
February 21, 2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#. 
242 The CIA World Factbook, “Africa: Egypt,” accessed February 25, 2015, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html. 
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5.11- Historical Education Levels in Egypt 
244 
 
5.12- Historical Female Unemployment in Egypt (Total Population)  
245 
                                                                                                                                                                     
243 The World Bank, “WorldDataBank: World Development Indicators: Egypt,” last updated 2015, accessed 
February 21, 2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#. 
244 Lire Ersado, “Education in Egypt: inequality of opportunity across three generations,” The World Bank, 
December 18, 2012, accessed February 28, 2015, http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/education-egypt-
inequality-opportunity-across-three-generations. 
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5.13- Unemployment rates for those with a tertiary education in Egypt (Male, 
Female, and Total) 
246 
 
5.14- Unemployment rates in Saudi Arabia (Population as a whole and Males) 
247 
                                                                                                                                                                     
245 The World Bank, “WorldDataBank: World Development Indicators: Egypt,” last updated 2015, 
accessed February 21, 2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#. 
246 The World Bank, “WorldDataBank: World Development Indicators: Egypt,” last updated 2015, 
accessed February 21, 2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#. 
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Appendix 2 
Additional Graphs Showing Entire MENA Region and Other Regions 
 
2.1- Composite Unemployment Rates for MENA 
 
248 
 
2.2- Composite Unemployment for the Arab World  
249 
                                                                                                                                                                     
247 The World Bank, “WorldDataBank: World Development Indicators: Saudi Arabia,” last updated 2015, 
accessed March 25, 2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#. 
248 The World Bank, “WorldDataBank: World Development Indicators” last updated 2015, accessed March 2, 
2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#. 
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2.3- Unemployment Levels for The East Asia and Pacific Region- For Comparison 
(note the much lower overall levels of unemployment).  
250 
 
2.3- Composite Unemployment for Developing States in Europe and Central Asia- 
For Comparison  
 
251 
                                                                                                                                                                     
249 The World Bank, “WorldDataBank: World Development Indicators” last updated 2015, accessed March 2, 
2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#. 
250 The World Bank, “WorldDataBank: World Development Indicators” last updated 2015, accessed March 2, 
2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#. 
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